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Abstract 
Given the failing Zimbabwean state, it is imperative to understand the role 
of the government of Robert Mugabe in its failure to provide democratic freedom 
and a functional economy. According to Mugabe, the economy is failing due to 
the enforcement of trade sanctions and the reduction in development aid. 
However, given that the international community is only willing to remove these 
impediments to economic development once Robert Mugabe leaves power, the 
President still maintains his grip on power. Even though the vast majority of 
Zimbabwe’s population is suffering under an economic meltdown, a rapidly 
declining life expectancy, and oppressive government actions limiting free 
speech and political participation, Robert Mugabe has managed to not only retain 
his grip on power but justify his continued leadership to members of the African 
community. How a leader like this manages to avoid pressures to resolve such a 
dehumanizing crisis for so many years is perplexing.  This report looks at the key 
tactics used by President Mugabe to remain in power by circumventing the 
democratic electoral process in Zimbabwe when the stakes became higher in 
2000. The report looks at the Zimbabwe situation until the second round of 
elections in 2008 and does not cover the events of 2009. Through the close 
examination of The Logic of Political Survival (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, 
Siverson and Morrow, 2003) and its selectorate theory, the paper concludes that 
the basis for longevity in power is not only based on oppression and loyalty but 
on the mentality of entitlement. After dealing with the question of how an 
authoritarian leader remains in power despite the social and economic 
devastation he or she may have caused, one is left with the question of how a 
society can reverse this notion of entitlement in order to free itself from 
oppression and economic devastation often brought on by such leaders. 
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Chapter 1  
 
Introduction 
 
On becoming Prime Minister in 1980, Robert Mugabe settled nicely into 
the position and strove to build a conciliatory working relationship with members 
of the former government at home and with the international community abroad. 
By and large, his initial efforts were successful. Aid began to pour in. “On the 
international stage Zimbabwe was accorded star status. One country after 
another lined up to help the new government make a success of its multiracial 
venture.”(Meredith, 2002, p.46) The leader of the revolution had finally taken his 
place as the country’s leader and the country was a shining example of post-
colonial Africa.  
However, an insight into the future brutality and autocratic style came to 
light very soon after Mugabe’s coming to power.  
 
During the Rhodesian war, violence had become his 
stock-in-trade….But once in power Mugabe continued to use 
violence to achieve his objectives. In the case of 
Matabeleland, the purpose was to crush opposition from 
Zapu. But subsequently when other opponents challenged 
his rule, he resorted to the use of violence time and time 
again. Indeed, he was later to boast that he had ‘a degree in 
violence.’ (Meredith, 2002, p.76)  
 
In fact, according to Michael Bratton and Eldred Masunungure, the history 
of the liberation movement had predetermined the violent and autocratic style of 
leadership.  
 
From the outset, Mugabe appears to have harbored a 
militaristic conception of political authority, proclaiming in 1976 that 
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‘our votes must go together with our guns; after all any vote . . . 
shall have been the product of the gun. The gun, which provides 
the votes, should remain its security officer, its guarantor.’ Even in 
the 1980 independence elections, ZANU-PF campaigned on the 
slogan that it had started the war of liberation, and was the only 
force that could end it. (2008, p.50) 
 
Over 28 years in power, Robert Mugabe has overseen the collapse of 
what used to be one of the most prosperous countries in southern Africa. In 
1980, the average annual income in Zimbabwe was $950 and the Zimbabwe 
dollar was worth more than the American one. (Guest, 2004, p.30)  According to 
the International Crisis Group, Zimbabweans today are facing an economic 
meltdown, corruption, food shortages and the collapse of vital services. HIV/AIDS 
among adults stands at over 20 percent. In November 2008 the annual inflation 
rate stood at officially 231 million percent, the highest in the world, making daily 
life for Zimbabweans unquestionably desperate. (McGreal, 2008) Reports vary 
on the actual percentage of the population that is thought to have fled over recent 
years. Some estimates have the number of Zimbabweans living in South Africa 
between 1.4 and 3 million people. This has resulted in remittances becoming a 
lifeline for many of those remaining. (International Crisis Group, 2008) The 
agricultural sector which was once a thriving and fundamental sector of the 
economy has been largely destroyed, leaving as many as five million 
Zimbabweans dependent on food relief. (Bratton and Masunungure, 2008) 
In addition to the economic collapse, the country has continued to witness 
and suffer the tactics of a brutal regime doing everything within its power to 
remain in power. From all accounts, beginning with the massacres in 
Matabeleland with the Fifth Brigade, throughout the 80s, Mugabe used 
presidential powers to suppress opposition which continued into the 90s and 
allowed him to, in effect, rule by decree, shutting down free media and fixing the 
democratic process in order to have an advantage over any opposition party 
brave enough to go up against him. The combination of this style of governing, 
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growing intolerance of any form of pluralism, and, occasionally, threats of 
dissidence from both outside and inside ZANU-PF contributed to more blatant 
manipulation of the electoral process. From 2000 and on, spurred by the growth 
of an electoral and NGO based opposition, there appears to be an all out war of 
intimidation and violence towards anyone not supporting the ruling party and its 
leader. 
In an attempt to maintain power, Mugabe has purged rivals and co-opted 
loyalists from within ZANU-PF and the Joint Operations Command (JOC) which 
is composed of the heads of the army, air force, police, prisons, and intelligence 
agency by enriching them at the cost of the larger public. Through these strategic 
relationships, violence, oppression and manipulated elections, Robert Mugabe 
has been able to circumvent the democratic process and retain power despite a 
collapsed social and economic state of the country. 
Zimbabwe held combined presidential and parliamentary elections on 
March 29, 2008. In the lead up, a wide variety of organizations and news media 
had expressed concerns about the inadequate preparation, evidence of 
irregularities associated with registration and inspection of the voters rolls, and 
concerns that the violence of the past would affect this campaign and election. 
Many observers suggested that the overall election environment was tarnished 
by the government’s brutal history of stamping out democratic freedoms of 
speech and association. Opposition groups feared the worst. According to a 
2007 Amnesty International report, fear of beatings and detention was common 
among the opposition groups and civil society organizations. Campaigning in the 
election, however, was relatively open and the opposition parties, including the 
government’s biggest threat, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), led 
by Morgan Tsvangirai, were able to campaign relatively freely and peacefully. 
The government did allow some international observers to observe the election 
process but only from countries that they deemed “friendly” but most foreign 
media were barred from the country. (International Crisis Group, 2008) Despite 
the uneven playing field, Zimbabweans clearly signaled their rejection of the 
status quo. For the first time in the country’s history, ZANU-PF lost control of 
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parliament to the MDC. The outcome of the presidential election was 
controversial with unprecedented delays in the announcement of official results. 
The Zimbabwe Election Commission (ZEC) withheld the results for over a month 
while reports from various news media and civil society organizations reported a 
countrywide campaign of violence and intimidation against supporters of the 
MDC. (UN News Centre, 2008)  Results released by the ZEC gave Tsvangirai 
47% against 42.3% for Mugabe, warranting a run-off election. 
On June 27th, 2008, a runoff of the top two candidates in the first round 
was held. Mugabe easily won against Tsvangirai, who had dropped out of the 
race several days before citing violence, intimidation and vote rigging.  
While the political situation following the June election was uncertain, 
Mugabe and his allies showed few signs of accepting defeat resulting in further 
violence as the president and ZANU-PF hardliners sought to retain their grip on 
power.1 A vivid reminder of their determination is obvious in their party 
propaganda. Michael Bratton and Eldred Masunungure note that “regime power 
in Zimbabwe has always been buttressed by coercion, chillingly symbolized in 
ZANU-PF’s trademark emblem, the fist.” (2008 p.50) 
 Two decades of mismanagement has lead to the increase in state 
sponsored violence and electoral manipulation especially since 2000. Thus, 
Mugabe’s choice of systematic violence in and around the 2008 elections was 
nothing new.  
 
Like a Cape buffalo, Mugabe has proven himself most 
dangerous when wounded and cornered. On the eve of the 
presidential election in March, he set the tone by threatening to 
wage war against the MDC in the event that he lost. As the election 
results trickled out and it became apparent that ZANU-PF had 
indeed lost control of the parliament and stood on the brink of 
losing the presidency too, the party-state launched a terror 
campaign of a scope and intensity never before seen in Zimbabwe. 
In stepping up the repression before the runoff election, ZANU-PF’s 
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apparent objective was to incapacitate, if not eliminate, the MDC as 
an electoral threat. (Bratton and Masunungure, 2008, p.50) 
 
 Is this determination to remain in power a reaction to possible retaliation 
by the people of Zimbabwe and the international courts or is this the 
determination of a man who believes that the presidency is “naturally” his to 
hold? According to some Mugabe analysts, this just may be the reason why he 
will never relinquish power peacefully. Author Heidi Holland believes that people 
should not expect a departure any time soon. “I think he plans to stay there until 
he dies, and I think he considers that his right. It's partly because he is such an 
old man and he comes from a tradition of African leadership which is based on 
the kingship model.”(Canadian Broadcasting Company, 2008) This sense of 
entitlement combined with the fact that he has “created a situation within ZANU-
PF in which he is practically irreplaceable” would lead some to believe that 
retirement may be some time away. (Moore, 2005, p. 132) It does appear 
however that the once undefeatable revolutionary leader has lost his claim to 
uncontested leadership in the eyes of the majority of people in Zimbabwe and an 
increasingly number of leaders in the neighborhood. (Heinlein, 2008) This has 
led to a round of power sharing negotiations which resulted in a deal which put 
Morgan Tsvangirai as Prime Minister and the sharing of government departments 
between ZANU (PF) and the MDC.  
In order to understand what continues to transpire in Zimbabwe with 
President Mugabe’s motivation and actions to maintain power, I have chosen to 
focus my document analysis on two key areas. A preliminary literature review 
revealed theoretical works which discusses dictatorial and authoritarian regimes. 
This provides a general framework with which Mugabe’s rule can be considered. 
The second area of literature concerns Robert Mugabe and the state of 
Zimbabwe during his years in power. This will allow us to understand how 
Mugabe established his power base and his iron grip on power after 1980, and 
provide context for his current attempt to remain in power at all costs. 
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In this paper I will discuss the theories of dictators and authoritarian 
governments and examine how they maintain power through strategic 
relationships, oppressive and violent measures and perverted democratic 
processes. I will then place and connect Robert Mugabe’s actions with these 
theories. By looking at the key tactics used by President Mugabe to remain in 
power by circumventing the democratic electoral process in Zimbabwe since 
2000, it is necessary to begin with a historical background from 1980 to 2000. 
The paper will then continue by investigating how and why the stakes for 
electoral and political survival became higher in 2000, which resulted in the ruling 
party’s strategy to maintain power through the electoral system while co-opting 
individuals and groups and purging, intimidating and assaulting others. The 
paper will then place the Mugabe regime within a theoretical framework of 
authoritarian governments and, by using the work of Prezeworski, Beuno de 
Mesquita et al. and Huntington, explain how and why such tactics were 
successful, despite the severe consequences to Zimbabwean society as a whole. 
The final two chapters provide an analysis of threats and challenges to his 
leadership and conclude with key reasons why he has been able to maintain 
power.  
The main focus of the theoretical works will be from The Logic of Political 
Survival by Beuno de Mesquita, Alistair Smith, Randolph Siverson and James D. 
Morrow (2003). The authors discuss the concept that democratic governments 
appear to offer their citizens more peace and prosperity than autocracies do, but 
autocratic leaders stay in office roughly twice as long as leaders in democratic 
nations. One of the conclusions is that, in many cases, good policies are 
detrimental to political survival, whereas bad policies or those often taken by 
authoritarian governments, often enhance political survival. They argue that 
governments with medium-sized selectorates2 (a political subset of society) are 
able to survive by enriching their selectorates and the smaller and essential, 
‘winning coalition’, at the cost of the larger public. In the case of Zimbabwe, 
Mugabe appears to allow his political circle to loot the country’s riches by taking 
advantage of things only available to those in the selectorate and winning 
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coalition such as favorable exchange rates on foreign currency and taking over of 
white owned farmland. Some observers, however, say that the drastic economic 
decline has undercut Mugabe’s ability to distribute patronage and thereby 
maintain political control. It is assumed that the “beneficiaries of the regime have 
shrunk to a small group of civilian and military cronies associated with the top 
organs of the party.” (Bratton and Masunungure, 2008 p.47) 
This report will examine Mugabe and his regime through the elements of 
the selectorate theory including the rigged electoral system currently being 
employed by the Mugabe regime, oppression and violence of those willing or 
perceived to be a threat to their leadership and loyalty of core constituents 
needed for leaders to survive.  
Interestingly, the authors of The Logic of Political Survival note that 
revolutionary leaders often promise democracy during the struggle to unseat the 
government but that things change once they come to power. In a passage eerily 
similar to that of the liberation movement of Zimbabwe, the authors reflect on 
other such revolutionaries.  
 
Mao, Kenyatta and innumerable other revolutionary leaders 
promise democracy, freedom, and equality. They offer peace and 
prosperity, but they all too often deliver corruption, poverty and 
despair...Before victory, revolutionaries and their followers are far 
removed from opportunities for personal gain enjoyed by members 
of the winning coalition. Being so removed, their preferred form of 
government is one that delivers public goods, and so they declare 
themselves in favor of just such a political systems…Having shifted 
from being outsiders to being those privileged with access to 
private benefits, they respond to their new incentives. The 
institutional preferences of outsiders are not the same as the 
institutional preferences of leaders, and only sometime are they the 
same as those held by members of the winning coalition…  
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If there institutional role changes, their incentives shift and so does 
their behavior…They may be constrained to implement democracy, 
as we will discuss shortly, but absent such constraints they can be 
expected to favor a rigged electoral system. (Bueno de Mesquita et 
al.,2003, pp. 375 -376) 
 
This change in a leader’s incentive is confirmed in the following two 
chapters when we deal with Mugabe’s coming to power in 1980 and the 
intentions of good governance and democracy which seemed to guide him. 
The analysis of documentation on Mugabe and the political and economic 
situation in Zimbabwe is extensive and varied. In Dinner with Mugabe (2008), 
Heidi Holland delves into the life of Mugabe and theorizes on his transition from a 
freedom fighter to a tyrant. Holland concludes that he is a leader who is out of 
touch with reality. A 28 year reign of paranoia began as a genuine hero who had 
conquered the country’s white supremacist regime but will be remembered by 
most as a tyrant who ruined his country. At 84 years of age today, Mugabe is 
unapologetic and continues to blame the economic crisis on the European Union 
and Britain. In a book that culminates with a 2 hour interview with Mugabe, 
Holland confirms that the tactics used by the President to maintain power are in 
his mind completely justifiable in order to protect the country from colonialism. 
When asked if he had any regrets, Mugabe replied, “No, no regrets. You go into 
a fight. It’s a fight against colonialism. You make sacrifices.” (p.242) Twenty eight 
years after liberation and Mugabe still appears to consider governing a 
continuous struggle against colonialism. 
Martin Meredith, covers Zimbabwe from independence until 2002 and 
provides his views on Mugabe’s role in the fall of Zimbabwe. Our Votes, Our 
Guns (2002) presents the recent history of Zimbabwe focusing on Robert 
Mugabe and why initial hopes were high that he had the intelligence, political 
awareness and vision to help the country recover from years of colonialism and 
civil war. But as time went on, Mugabe became increasingly autocratic and his 
tactics increasingly violent. In recent years he has unleashed a reign of terror and 
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corruption in his country. “The shock of his defeat in the referendum in 2000 was 
thus all the more profound. His reaction was to resort to the methods that had 
served him so well in the past: violence and intimidation.” (p.236) Meredith 
recounts the events leading up to the 2002 elections by taking us through 
Gukurahundi and the Matabeleland massacres, the deal with the war veterans 
and the subsequent land issues which have all but crippled the state’s economy. 
All in the name of wiping out his opponents and ensuring support from key 
political allies, the military and the ruthless war veterans to ensure his political 
survival. “Determined to remain in power, he used all the resources of 
government to attack his opponents, sanctioning murder, torture, and 
lawlessness of every kind.” (p.236) 
 As mentioned earlier, for the purpose of theoretical examination, the 
paper will focus on the period beginning in 2000 until 2008. In Zimbabwe’s 
Plunge (2002), Patrick Bond and Masimba Manyanya give a succinct synopsis of 
the difficulties beginning in 2000 brought on by two decades of (mis)management 
by Mugabe.  
 
One sign earlier that year was the electorate’s rejection of a 
constitutional referendum promoted heavily by the Zanu 
government. In desperation, Mugabe resurrected Zanu’s most 
militant, often virulent strain of nationalist demagoguery, attempting 
as time ran out to simultaneously ‘solve’ the long-standing land 
distribution problem, terrorize supporters of the opposition, and 
pass the buck for his own failings to the country’s small white 
population, foreign countries (especially Britain and the US), 
imperialism in general and the IMF in particular. (p. 74) 
 
Information and reports on the elections by the media and by NGOs which 
outline the lead up, Election Day and post election period was also analyzed. 
This documentation has provided insight into whether the elections were 
considered to be true democratic actions or simply tools used by the authoritarian 
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regime to present a democratic facade. It also provided details into what has 
been done by the Mugabe regime to postpone the election results, intimidate 
voters and exclude selected foreign journalists and observers. These documents 
include various reports from the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) and 
the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA). These sources of data are 
invaluable in order to study the election process and any manipulation of the 
process by the political parties or state.  
Additional documentation includes reports from various international and 
domestic organizations who report on the economic collapse of Zimbabwe. The 
reports deal with unemployment, inflation, food shortages and the health and 
democracy crisis caused by the economic meltdown. Reports from organizations 
such as the International Crisis Group (ICG) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) in 
addition to scholarly journals and various media reports were used to collect data 
on the declining state of Zimbabwe’s economy and standard of living.  
By using existing documentation which sets the framework for 
authoritarian rulers to develop strategic relationships and hold questionable 
elections in the name of democracy, I hope to add to the existing body of 
knowledge around the authoritarian state of Zimbabwe and its leader through a 
closer look at the tactics used to circumvent the democratic process and retain 
power despite a collapsed social and economic state of the nation primarily 
through the selectorate theory outlined in The Logic of Political Survival.  
Research conducted was given appropriate ethical considerations. 
Research conducted by document analysis was done with documentation that 
was used was in the public domain and properly referenced. According to the 
WITS ethical guidelines, approval of the research paper proposal was obtained 
from the Wits University Ethics Committee.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Mugabe’s coming to power and the period leading up to 2000 
 
Given the failing state of Zimbabwe, it is imperative to understand the 
history of the current government of Robert Mugabe in its failure to provide 
democratic freedom and a functional economy. What has lead to the 
government’s failure? According to Mugabe, the economy is failing due to the 
enforcement of trade sanctions and the reduction in development aid. 
(Chadenga, 2008) Given that the international community appears willing to 
remove these impediments to economic development once Robert Mugabe 
leaves power, the President still maintains his grip on power. Even though the 
vast majority of the population are suffering under an economic meltdown, a 
rapidly declining life expectancy, and citizens associated with the opposition 
continue to suffering brutal beatings, the ability of Robert Mugabe to not only 
retain his grip on power but what appeared to be his ability to justify his continued 
leadership to members of the African community and avoid pressures to resolve 
the crisis for so many years is perplexing. (Baldauf & Schatz, 2008)  
This chapter will provide an historical background to Mugabe’s coming to 
power and the first 20 years of his reign including the brutality which came to light 
very soon after coming to power. Gukurahundi, interpreted as “the sweeping 
away of rubbish” (Meredith, 2002, p.66), began in 1982, when Mugabe 
unleashed his special North Korean trained army to quash any opposition rising 
from political dissidents from Zapu led by Joshua Nkomo. This unleashing 
resulted in the deaths of several hundred dissidents but also thousands of 
civilians. Beginning from the massacres in Matabeleland throughout the 80’s 
using totalitarian powers devised by the Rhodesian leader Ian Smith to his own 
Presidential Powers Act in 1990 has allowed him to in effect rule by decree.  
This chapter will lead to the 2000 elections and the growing desperation of 
the government brought on by the electorate’s rejection of a constitutional 
referendum earlier that year. The chapter will also look into the increasing 
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terrorization of opposition supporters and the country’s economic failings due to 
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, the war vets and the land 
distribution issue. 
 
A Brief History of Rhodesia 
 
What is now known as Zimbabwe was formally named Rhodesia after 
Cecil Rhodes, an English born businessman and South African politician, in 
1895. European immigrants took advantage of Rhodesia’s rich mineral and 
agricultural resource potential which eventually led to demand for more land 
which resulted in the passage of a series of land apportionment acts that 
reserved certain areas for Europeans.  These land acts culminated with the 
control of 46.9% of Rhodesia’s land under the whites, who comprised 5% of the 
population. (Stone, 2007) 
In 1964, the white majority population, growing more concerned about the 
possibility of majority rule replaced Prime Minister Winston Field, who was 
accused by the white population in Rhodesia for being too moderate and not 
moving quickly enough to obtain Rhodesian independence, with Ian Smith. In 
1965, Prime Minster Smith led his Rhodesian Front Party to an overwhelming 
victory in the general elections. On November 11, 1965, after lengthy and 
unsuccessful negotiations with the British Government, Prime Minister Smith 
issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from the United Kingdom.  
(US State Dept., 2008)  
Prior to this UDI, Britain wanted assurances from Rhodesia that, before 
independence was granted, they would move toward majority rule. The white 
Rhodesians refused to give such assurances. Britain considered the UDI 
unconstitutional and illegal but they did not enter into the realm of military force to 
gain back control of Rhodesia. The UDI prompted international sanctions and 
guerrilla war but since Britain did not intervene to uphold British law, the white 
Rhodesians were allowed to continue their apartheid system of rule. 
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Anti-government guerilla activity increased dramatically causing 
uncertainty in the 70s.  “In 1974, the major African nationalists groups--the 
Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National 
Union (ZANU), which split away from ZAPU in 1963--were united into the 
"Patriotic Front" and combined their military forces.” (US state Dept, 2008) The 
violence and economic sanctions continued to put pressure on the Rhodesian 
government and in 1976, “the Smith government agreed in principle to majority 
rule and to a meeting in Geneva with black nationalist leaders to negotiate a final 
settlement of the conflict.” (US State Dept, 2008) 
In order to bring closure to the Rhodesian issue indefinitely, deliberations 
with all parties began at Lancaster House in London on September 10, 1979. 
Three months later on December 12, British Governor Lord Christopher Soames 
arrived in Salisbury to reassert British authority over the colony. “His arrival 
signaled the end of the Rhodesian rebellion and the ‘internal settlement’, as well 
as the beginning of Zimbabwe's transition to independence.”  (US State Dept, 
2008) All remaining sanctions were lifted and on December 21 the parties signed 
an agreement calling for a cease-fire, new elections, a transition period under 
British rule, and a new constitution implementing majority rule while protecting 
minority rights. (US State Dept, 2008) 
Zimbabwe held pre independence elections in February 1980 where nine 
political parties campaigned. The elections were monitored by hundreds of 
observers, most of who concluded that the elections were free and fair and 
reflected the will of the people. Robert Mugabe's ZANU (PF) party won an 
absolute majority and was asked to form Zimbabwe's first government.  Mugabe 
won 57 seats of 80 reserved for blacks, becoming Zimbabwe’s Prime Minister. 
The Rhodesian Front Party won all 20 seats reserved for whites.  
Prime Minister Mugabe spoke of national reconciliation and 
reconstruction. 
   
His priorities were to integrate the various armed forces, 
reestablish social services and education in rural areas, and 
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resettle the estimated one million refugees and displaced persons. 
Mugabe also announced that his government would begin 
investigating ways of reversing past discriminatory policies in land 
distribution, education, employment, and wages. (US State Dept, 
2008) 
 
A New Zimbabwe 
 
In seeking national reconciliation, Mugabe's announced his cabinet which 
included members of ZANU-PF, PF-ZAPU, and independent white members of 
parliament (MPs) and senators.  
This inclusive policy of reconciliation was mostly successful during the 
country's first two years of independence.  “Ian Smith and many of his associates 
held seats in the parliament where they participated freely in debates. Likewise, 
Joshua Nkomo, Mugabe's rival as leader of the nationalist forces, was included in 
the first cabinet along with several other members of PF-ZAPU.” (US State Dept, 
2008) However, this honeymoon was not to last. According to Bond and 
Manyanya, the inclusiveness was soon to be undermined. “Under the rubric of 
nationalism, Zimbabwe’s state and ruling Zanu party became indistinguishable 
during the 1980s. A lower-middle class was quickly built through the bureaucracy 
and corruption and patronage systems emerged.” (2002, p.25) The issue of 
loyalty within the bureaucracy was ensured through healthy salaries and the 
hopes of entering into the leader’s ‘winning coalition’ assuring perks and benefits 
unavailable to the vast majority of the population.  “There were also lamentable 
ethnic overtones. Shona dominance of the state included repression of the 
minority Ndebele people.” (2002, p.25) 
Serious unraveling of the inclusiveness began when Government security 
officials discovered large caches of arms and ammunition on properties owned 
by ZAPU. This led to Nkomo and his followers being accused of plotting to 
overthrow Mugabe's government. Nkomo and his closest aides were expelled 
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from the cabinet. This resulted in PF-ZAPU supporters forming a “campaign of 
dissidence against the government.” (US state Dept, 2008) 
 
Centering primarily in Matabeleland, home of the Ndebeles 
who were PF-ZAPU's main followers, this dissidence continued 
through 1987 and involved attacks on government personnel and 
installations, armed banditry aimed at disrupting security and 
economic life in the rural areas, and harassment of ZANU-PF 
members. Occasionally, some demanded that Nkomo and his 
colleagues be reinstated in the cabinet. More frequently, however, 
dissidents called for the return of farms and other properties seized 
from PF-ZAPU. (US State Dept, 2008) 
  
In 1983-84, the government declared a curfew in areas of Matabeleland 
and sent in the army in an attempt to suppress dissidents. Gukurahundi, 
interpreted as “the sweeping away of rubbish” (Meredith, 2002, p.66), began in 
1982 when Mugabe unleashed his special North Korean trained army (5 Brigade) 
to quash any opposition rising from political dissidents from Zapu led by Joshua 
Nkomo. This unleashing resulted in the deaths of several hundred dissidents but 
also thousands of civilians. The Fifth Brigade also “imposed stringent curfews, 
banned all forms of transport, closed shops, and blocked drought relief supplies 
for villagers facing starvation.” (Meredith, 2002, p.67)  Nkomo and his lieutenants 
repeatedly denied any connection with the dissidents. While this event was 
largely ignored by the Western media, it still remains a significant scar on the 
people affected and on the country’s history as a whole. “Zimbabwe’s 
honeymoon was over. Matabeleland became an indelible stain on Mugabe’s 
record and on Zimbabwe’s post independence history.” (Meldrum, 2005, p. 65) 
In the 1985 elections, ZANU-PF increased its majority, holding 67 of the 
100 seats. ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU agreed to unite in December 1987, and the 
parties formally merged in December 1989. Although ethnic tensions simmered, 
this unity pact set the stage for a de facto one-party state which lasted until the 
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2000 parliamentary elections. “Once Zapu was repressed and co-opted, the 
opposition consisted of two parties that could not attract more than a fifth of the 
electorate: the Zimbabwe Unity Movement in 1990 and Forum Party in 1995.” 
(Bond & Manyanya, 2002, p. 25) “Mugabe’s early efforts to codify the one-party 
state in law were beaten back by not only human rights advocates and various 
small right-leaning political parties, but by international opinion, at a time Mugabe 
sought extended access to global financial markets.” (Bond & Manyanya, 2002, 
p. 25) In fact, Mugabe’s desire for a one party state led to his actions to do 
whatever was necessary to achieve this. In Mugabe: Teacher, Revolutionary, 
Tyrant (2008), Andrew Norman states that Mugabe’s determination to crush all 
opposition is clarified by his statement made in 1983. “The one-party state is 
more in keeping with African traditions. It makes for greater unity for the people. 
It puts all opinions under one umbrella whether these opinions are radical or 
reactionary.” (p. 79) This was seen by many observers, however, as one of 
Mugabe’s key failures which led to future problems. Andrew Meldrum writes that 
“although he tortured Matabeleland into submission, he never succeeded in 
achieving his goal of a one-party state. After Zanu-PF swallowed Zapu in 1987, 
Mugabe ruled over a de facto single-party state, it is true, but he never 
succeeded in making it illegal for any other party to challenge his rule.” (2005, 
p.73) 
Mugabe and his party won another overwhelming majority in March 1990 
winning 117 of the 120 election seats. However, voter turnout was only 54%, 
and the campaign was not free and fair in the sense that opposition candidates 
and supporters were subjected to harassment and some violent attacks. The 
merger between the PF-ZAPU and ZANU-PF was reflected in the campaign 
manifesto which put the contribution of the parties to the liberation struggle at 
the forefront. This left the only other serious rival ZUM (Zimbabwe Unity 
Movement) headed by Edgar Tekere without a chance. This political 
domination did not stop the violence and intimidation that ZANU PF has 
become famous for. (US State Dept, 2008) 
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None of the other political parties made any significant 
impact. A lower intensity of such violence as there was in the 
general elections is attributable in part to the merger of the two 
principle parties. ZUM candidates and supporters were 
nevertheless often given a hard time. In the Midlands, Masvingo, 
Manicaland, and Mashonaland East they were subjected to 
harassment and vilification and accorded little police protection. 
ZUM members were attacked in the Gwero, Karoi, Kwekwe, 
Makoni Central, and Mufakose constituencies. Patrick Kombayi, 
mayor of Gweru and a former ZANU-PF official, was abducted and 
shot but remained in the race. There was also an attempt on the life 
of Jerry Nyambuyaa, also a ZUM member. (Lodge, Kadima & 
Pottie, 2002, pp. 442-443) 
The 1990s continued to witness unrest with demonstrations by the student 
movements, trade unionists and workers expressing their discontent with the 
government.  
 Students protested in October 1990 against proposals for an 
increase in government control of universities and again in May 
1991 and May 1992, when they clashed with police. Trade 
unionists and workers were also vocal critics of the government 
during this time. In June 1992, police prevented trade unionists 
from holding anti-government demonstrations. In 1994, there was 
widespread industrial unrest. In August and September 1996, 
thousands of civil servants demanding salary increases organized a 
national strike and in October and November of the same year, 
nurses and junior doctors went on strike over salary issues. (US 
State Dept, 2008) 
Things were changing rapidly and the legitimacy of the government was 
fading fast. This opposition was having an effect on Mugabe. In one particular 
  Kevin Colbourne – Masters Research Paper 
 23 
case Mugabe clearly showed his tactics of attacking a minority in order to gain 
the support of the majority. In 1995 at Zimbabwe’s International Book Fair with a 
theme on Human Rights and Justice, Mugabe railed against homosexuals. Andy 
Meldrum who watched the perplexed faces of young children sitting on the floor 
during the speech states “It was a classic example of Mugabe trying to regain his 
waning popularity by attacking a minority group. In other speeches, he would 
vilify Jews, the British, white farmers, church leaders, human rights organizations 
and any group that challenged him.” (2005 p. 92) This tactic appeared to work 
along with his control of the media, the huge level of state control over the 
economy and industry and the security forces. All of this allowed Mugabe and his 
party to keep organized political opposition to a minimum through most of the 
1990s. 
To be fair, the unrest spreading throughout the population was not only 
the fault of Mugabe and his party. The Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programme (ESAP) which was designed in 1990 for the most part by the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund was set up to “deregulate and indebt 
an economy seen as overprotected and inefficient.” (Bond & Manyanya, 2002, p. 
XV) The effects of ESAP on Zimbabwe have documented by many observers. 
Bond and Manyanya outline its failures. 
  
In reality, ESAP failed miserably. GDP growth only reached 
5% during one year (1994) and averaged just 1.2% from 1991-
1995. Inflation averaged more than 30% during the period, and 
never dropped anywhere near the 10% goal. The budget deficit 
was more than 10% of GDP during the ESAP era (with no prospect 
of getting down to the targeted 5% from a drought-related high of 
13% in 1994/1995). (2002, p. 32) 
  
It is important to remember as well that the ESAP was brought in due to 
Rhodesia’s economic difficulties including increased budget allocation on 
defense and the cumulative effects of the sanctions mentioned earlier. However, 
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the ultimate collapse of the economy appears to have been precipitated however 
by decisions made by Mugabe in order to maintain the support of what he 
believed to be an essential element of his ‘selectorate’.  “The precise moment 
that the Zimbabwean economy began its generalized plunge was probably the 
late morning of 14 November 1997, when over a four-hour period, the Zimbabwe 
dollar lost 74% of its value.” (Bond & Manyanya, 2002, p. 38) This plunge was 
due to what Bond and Manyana believe to be the two political events in 
September-October 1997 that attract the most blame from commentators while 
keeping in mind the existing financial woes brought on by the former government 
of Ian Smith.  
 
First, bucking strident advice and monetary arm-twisting 
from international financial institutions, Mugabe paid off a challenge 
to his legitimacy from more than 50 000 liberation war veterans by 
granting them Z$50,000 each plus Z$2,000 per month pension. The 
excombatants were successful essentially because their 1997 
demonstrations in Harare and intense harassment of Mugabe 
caused acute embarrassment. The World Bank immediately 
suspended balance of payments support.  
Mugabe also suddenly announced that at last government 
would begin implementing the Land Designation Act, and 1500 
mainly white-owned farms were identified for redistribution. Even 
though only partial compensation was promised – covering 
buildings and infrastructure, not inflated land value – again this 
raised the likelihood of fiscal convulsion. The damage to the 
commercial agricultural sector and related industries would be 
heightened by the fact (and past experience), as conceded by the 
agriculture minister in a subsequent radio broadcast, that the 
recipients of the farms would include wealthy politicians ahead of 
land-starved peasants. (This patronage route was important, at a 
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time other state-based options for embourgeoisement were 
closing.) (2002, p.39)  
 
With the effects of ESAP and growing independence for the Zimbabwe 
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), widespread opposition to the ruling party 
began (Moore, 2005, p. 129), leading observers to believe that these decisions 
by the government appear to have been motivated simply by regaining or holding 
key support for Mugabe. “Because the ZANU-PF was reliant on support from 
Shona areas and the rural districts, including the war veterans who were 
dissatisfied over the pace of land reform, Mugabe was pressured into 
implementing this more proactive land redistribution.” (Stone, 2007)  
This political and economic upheaval, not to mention worsening human 
rights conditions, resulted in the formation of the Movement for Democratic 
Change (MDC) in September 1999.  In February 2000, the MDC’s first 
opportunity to challenge Mugabe came during the referendum campaign on a 
draft constitution backed by the government which among other things would 
have allowed Mugabe to seek two additional terms in office, granted government 
officials immunity from prosecution, and authorized government seizure of white-
owned land. The referendum was easily defeated. In the days leading up to the 
referendum, Andy Meldrum was waiting in line at the Registration office in 
Harare. “I eventually succeeded in getting my national registration papers but 
much more importantly, I picked up the mood of the people. My day at the 
Registration office told me that average people were not inclined to endorse the 
constitution in any way.” (2005, p. 123) Meldrum continues that after the results 
were announced, “Young people started shouting that Mugabe had been given a 
yellow card, like in a football match, and that in the parliamentary elections he 
would be given a red card and sent off the field altogether.” (2005, p. 124) This 
excitement and hope for the future was not to last long. “Within 2 weeks of the 
rejection of his constitution, he (Mugabe) had come up with a new strategy that 
would crush his opponents, quell the stirring of unrest within his party and 
reinvigorate his image as the most radical African leader: the land invasions.” 
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(2005, p. 125) This government sanctioned group of war veterans was 
characterized by forcing white farmers from their land and included violence 
against both farmers and farm employees. 
 The constitution referendum was the first time people voted against the 
Mugabe regime in clear protest. However, later that same year Mugabe defeated 
newly formed Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) opposition in June 2000 
parliamentary elections, though missing two-thirds majority needed to change 
constitution. According to the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, the 
referendum and elections held in 2000 was good for the people of Zimbabwe 
given the fact that the referendum was defeated and ZANU PF did not receive 
the necessary majority in parliament to make changes to the constitution. It also 
concluded that the government was not prepared to give up power easily. 
  
 The year 2000 saw many different violations of human, as 
well as political, rights. The much-needed overhaul of Zimbabwe’s 
Constitution foundered over basic issues of executive power. The 
people’s rejection of attempts to extend what they saw as already 
over-arrogated power led to massive violence, during which human 
rights were abused on a large scale. Manipulation of the electoral 
process, including attempts to render monitoring ineffectual, 
endangered existing political rights. But the results of the election 
meant that Zanu-PF no longer had the capacity to amend the 
Constitution without subverting at least eight opposition MPs. In an 
attempt to win back its earlier two-thirds majority, and control of the 
Constitution, it has used violence in by-elections similarly as in the 
general elections. (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2001) 
 
As noted earlier, true opposition to Mugabe began in 1999. The MDC was 
formed and former National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) chair, and trade 
union leader Morgan Tsvangirai became the head of the MDC. Brendan Stone 
provides a succinct analysis of where the MDC drew its support.  This included:  
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…non-Shona speaking regions, or about one-fifth of 
Zimbabwe's population, including the Ndebele Matabeleland 
minority, as well as urban centres, and the NCA's support base. 
The "economically privileged white minority," which had hitherto 
supported ZANU-PF, or abstained from elections, turned their 
support towards the MDC. Essentially, the party managed to unite 
the many diverse elements oppose to Mugabe's ZANU-PF 
government, running on an 'anybody but Mugabe' platform. (2008) 
 
As we can see, after losing some of his initial supporters such as the white 
minority population and the non-Shona speaking regions, Mugabe became 
increasingly reliant on the rural Shona population, the army and the war vets in 
order to pursue his quest for continued and unfettered power. According to 
Michael Bratton and Eldred Masunungure, this support base was reinforced 
through the politicized party-state.   
The major prize that ZANU­PF won at independence was the 
apparatus of the state, including its military machinery and economic 
resources. Since that time, the party has sought the vanguard role in 
society—as well as the supremacy over the state—historically 
associated with communist systems. The ruling party and public 
administration are fused, and organizational structures are conflated at 
all levels—the party is married to the state. (2008, p.44) 
 
A party-state supported by an ethnic constituency and military force 
appears to have been the beginning of a long extended fight for Mugabe to 
remain in power and continue to rule into the 21st century regardless of the 
consequences to the land and people he helped liberate. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Focusing its strategy - Events from 2000 – 2008 
 
The survival tactics used by Mugabe and Zanu-PF during the period of 
2000 to 2008 will be examined in this chapter, with a focus on the elections held 
within this period as well as the increasing role of the military in the day to day 
governing of the state.  
This chapter will take us to the most recent elections held in 2008. These 
elections appeared to be somewhat free and peaceful but the strong showing by 
the opposition resulted in unprecedented delays in the announcement of the 
official results followed by a countrywide campaign of violence and intimidation 
against supporters of the MDC. The violence, killings and intimidation throughout 
the run off presidential election in June, 2008 led to the withdrawal of the 
opposition candidate, Morgan Tsvangirai, from the race. With no opponent and 
an army of intimidating supporters, Mugabe secured a victory which was widely 
condemned by most of the international community, including, for the first time, 
several members of the African Union. (Heinlein, 2008) We will see that these 
tactics of intimidation and violence were used in the 2002 and 2005 elections as 
well. 
The decade began on a positive note for the opposition movement. By 
defeating the government in a constitutional referendum in 2000, and winning 57 
out of 120 contested seats in parliamentary elections that year, the MDC 
challenged ZANU PF’s hegemony. On the other hand, it has also put the 
government and Mugabe on a path of election rigging, violence and intimidation 
not seen since the liberation fight for Rhodesia. The blatant manipulation of the 
electoral process, not seen prior to the elections in 2000, was combined with an 
all out war of intimidation and violence towards anyone not supporting the ruling 
party of Zanu-PF and its leader, Robert Mugabe.  
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 A rattled ZANU-PF retaliated with repressive legislation and 
violence. It introduced the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), a 
colonial-style instrument aimed at inhibiting the opposition’s political 
gatherings. The party also unleashed war veterans in a chaotic 
campaign to evict white farmers from commercial farmland, and 
mobilized militias under the guise of a national youth-training 
program. In other words, ZANU-PF signaled in physical as well as 
ideological terms that it would not tolerate the emergence of a 
democratic opposition. And by rigging elections for the presidency 
in 2002 and parliament in 2005, the authoritarian regime honed its 
strategies for hanging onto power even in the face of legitimate 
electoral challenges. (Bratton & Masunungure, 2008 p. 45) 
During the presidential election held in March 2002 and the parliamentary 
election held in 2005, Mugabe resorted to using state machinery, war veterans 
and youth militias to intimidate, suppress dissent, gag media, manipulate food aid 
and violate human rights. Although these elections were denounced by 
international observers as neither free nor fair, both elections were endorsed by 
South Africa and, in 2005, by the African Union (AU) as well. (International Crisis 
Group, 2008)  How did Mugabe manage to have the state machinery, war 
veterans and youth militias? According to Bratton and Masunungure, besides 
giving into demands by the war vets, after independence, ZANU-PF used 
demobilized war veterans and returnees from Zimbabwe’s international diaspora 
to penetrate the civilian bureaucracy and the security agencies. (2008, p. 45) 
This was the beginning of the politicized party-state referred to in chapter two.  
For example, in the run-up to the 1995 elections, a ZANU-PF 
official threatened to dismiss civil servants who might support an 
opposition party. In early 2001, war veterans stormed local 
authorities in opposition districts, locking local-government offices, 
closing schools, and demanding the dismissal of councilors, 
teachers, and other workers. The country’s judiciary—the last 
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bastion of autonomy from the party-state—was not spared. In 2001, 
the authorities launched a campaign to intimidate senior jurists into 
retirement and to ‘restructure’ the court system by naming a dozen 
new judges to the High and Supreme Courts. (Bratton & 
Masunungure, 2008, p.45) 
After the referendum defeat and a strong showing by the MDC in 2000, 
the stakes for Robert Mugabe in the 2002 election were extremely high. Mugabe, 
while ensuring that the process on Election Day was free and fair, was declared 
the winner over challenger Morgan Tsvangirai by a 56% to 42% margin. 
However, most international observers condemned the election as seriously 
flawed with the pre-election environment being neither free nor fair. Some 
observers believed that the election itself was marred by significant fraud and 
rigging. The Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) released a report on 
the 2002 elections and stated that although the polling day procedures appeared 
to be fair, the problems were in the climate leading up to Election Day. 
 
Moreover, the Presidential Elections in Zimbabwe in March 
2002 were conducted in an environment of strong polarisation, 
political violence and an election administration with severe 
shortcomings. The political and security climate in which the 
elections were conducted was complex, characterised by high 
levels of polarisation and political intolerance, lack of 
communication amongst stakeholders and lack of free flow of 
information to the electorate, all of which are necessary conditions 
for democracy to prevail. 
 It was clear to us that while the actual polling and counting 
processes were peaceful and the secrecy of the ballot was 
assured, the Presidential election in Zimbabwe was marred by a 
high level of politically motivated violence and intimidation, which 
preceded the poll. While violent acts were carried out by supporters 
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of both of the main political parties, it is our view that most of these 
were perpetrated by members / supporters of the ruling party 
against members / supporters of the opposition.  
 We were particularly concerned about the activities of 
paramilitary youth groups organised under a ‘National Youth 
Training Programme’. Members of these groups were responsible 
for a systematic campaign of intimidation against known or 
suspected supporters of the main opposition party, the Movement 
for Democratic Change, MDC. The violence and intimidation 
created a climate of fear and suspicion. 
 In many areas, there were reports of a strong fear of 
expressing political opinions. Observers reported on clear instances 
of fear among voters. Despite several instances of intimidation of 
polling agents and police raids against the opposition party offices, 
polling agents of the two major candidates have been deployed in 
an impressive manner. (2002) 
 As a result of the tactics used by Mugabe in the 2002 presidential election, 
the United States, the EU, and other European countries imposed travel 
restrictions against senior Zimbabwean officials and embargoed the sale of arms 
to Zimbabwe.  The Commonwealth also suspended Zimbabwe from council 
meetings when its election observer team found the election neither free nor fair. 
After extending Zimbabwe’s suspension, Mugabe eventually withdrew his country 
from the Commonwealth. (US State Dept) Despite the international outcry 
followed up with sanctions, the 2005 parliamentary elections did not prove to be 
any less controversial. A report by the British House of Commons confirmed that 
intimidation and fear among opposition voters was still very real. The report 
included reports and observations made by several international organizations 
and by the US Embassy in Harare.   
 Commentators agree that there was much less evidence of 
violence during the 2005 election campaign than in the run-up to 
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the June 2000 parliamentary election and the presidential election 
in March 2002. However, opposition leaders and human rights 
groups claimed that there was still a high level of intimidation, and 
that the legacy of past political violence would affect the election 
result. 
 
 The report quoted the Human Rights Watch (HRW) election report 
released on 21 March 2005 and based on research in Zimbabwe in December 
2004 and February 2005, and made the following assessment: 
 
 The government of Zimbabwe has greatly limited the space 
for the opposition to campaign. It has restricted the rights to 
freedom of expression, association and assembly in many parts of 
the country. Opposition party members and ordinary citizens have 
been intimidated by ruling party supporters and officials, war 
veterans, and youth militia. The government has, thus, substantially 
infringed the right of Zimbabweans to freely form and express their 
political opinions and electoral judgments. In short, due to this 
climate of intimidation and repression, the playing field for the 2005 
election has not been level.  
 
 The International Crisis Group (ICG) report was included with the House 
of Commons report and stated: 
 
 President Mugabe and ZANU-PF appear to have 
approached the elections with twin goals: first, to ensure they could 
control the results; and secondly, to do so in a way sophisticated 
enough that some international observers could call the exercise 
“clean”. They did not resort to violence as often as in the past and 
even tolerated a number of opposition campaign rallies and 
speeches but the threat of physical harm … was never far below 
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the surface. Much of the window dressing of a fair contest was 
permitted but the regime still engaged in systematic abuses. 
 
 The International Crisis Group report is quoted again when they stated 
that “by any objective standard, the election was neither free nor fair”, 
commenting: 
 
 While the means employed to capture the election were 
more sophisticated and less violent then in the past, the result was 
the same. To find otherwise, it was necessary to look past ZANU-
PF’s systematic use of propaganda, violence, electoral 
manipulation, targeted disenfranchisement and abuse of 
humanitarian relief. 
 
 Finally, the House of Commons report also included the election 
observations of representatives from the US Embassy in Harare quoting their 
findings as follows: 
 
 …ZANU-PF agents and the police appeared to have 
improper roles in the supervision or conduct of the polling stations 
and in the operation of ZEC constituency tabulation centers. In 
several instances, Embassy observers witnessed uniformed police 
participating in the vote compilation instead of ZEC officials at the 
constituency tabulation centers. In addition, some polling stations 
were located in areas that would be intimidating to some voters, 
such as next to police stations or within 200 meters of a ZANUPF 
office. Some polling stations also appeared to be associated with 
the distribution of food. Finally, in many polling stations observed, 
the percentages of voters turned away were as high as 30%. 
Compounding concern over the foregoing irregularities is the 
silence of the Zimbabwe Election Commission on crucial issues. It 
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has failed to release the voting results of any polling stations. It has 
failed to explain why its initial release of totals of ballots cast only 
included six of the country’s ten provinces, nor explained why it 
never released results for the remaining four provinces. Moreover, 
it has failed to explain why discrepancies between its announced 
figure for ballots cast in constituencies for those six provinces 
differed so drastically from the subsequently released official 
combined vote totals for candidates in the constituencies… 
(Andrews & Morgan, 2005)  
 
In April 2007, the South African Development Community (SADC) 
mandated South African President Mbeki to mediate between Robert Mugabe’s 
government and MDC. The mediation was an attempt to agree upon an election 
date and procedures to rewrite the constitution. Talks ended in January 2008, 
when Mugabe called a snap election to be held in March despite the MDC’s call 
for elections to be held off until a new constitution was adopted and enough time 
existed to have a credible campaign. 
On 29 March 2008, Zimbabwe held combined presidential and 
parliamentary elections. In the lead up, a wide variety of organizations and news 
media had expressed concerns about the inadequate preparation, evidence of 
irregularities associated with registration and inspection of the voters rolls, and 
concerns that the violence of the past would affect this campaign and election. 
Many observers suggested that the overall election environment was tarnished 
by the government’s brutal history of stamping out democratic freedoms of 
speech and association. Opposition groups feared the worst. According to a 
2007 Amnesty International report, fear of beatings and detention was common 
among the opposition groups and civil society organizations. Campaigning in the 
election, however, was relatively open and the opposition parties, including the 
government’s biggest threat, the MDC, led by Morgan Tsvangirai, were able to 
campaign relatively freely and peacefully. The government did allow some 
international observers to observe the election process but only from countries 
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that they deemed “friendly” (International Crisis Group, 2008) but most foreign 
media were barred from the country. Despite the uneven playing field, it appears 
that Zimbabweans clearly signaled their rejection of the status quo. For the first 
time in the country’s history, ZANU-PF lost control of parliament to the MDC. The 
outcome of the presidential election was controversial with unprecedented delays 
in the announcement of official results. The ZEC withheld the results for over a 
month calling into question the credibility and independence of the commission. 
Reports from various news media and civil society organizations reported a 
countrywide campaign of violence and intimidation against supporters of the 
MDC. (UN News Centre, 2008) When results were released voters gave 
Tsvangirai 47% against 42.3% for Mugabe warranting a run-off. However, 
Tsvangirai dropped out of the race several days before citing violence, 
intimidation and vote rigging providing Mugabe with an easy victory. 
It appears that since these elections Zanu-PF and its leader, Robert 
Mugabe, are no longer in sole charge of the country and the runoff elections. It is 
believed by some Zimbabwe watchers that the members of the security 
establishment are believed to be directing day to day operations of the 
government, the election campaign and the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission 
through the army, air force, police, prisons, and intelligence agency or the Joint 
Operations Command (JOC).  While the important role of the JOC in the running 
of the country over the last couple of years was understood, they now appear to 
be playing a more significant role in the electoral strategy and within the electoral 
commission. According to Bratton &  Masunungure (2008), all election results, 
including the long delayed announcement of Mugabe’s loss to Tsvangirai in the 
first round of the 2008 election, were said to be forwarded to the JOC for 
approval before being sent to the national command center for release. Bratton & 
Masunungure have used insider accounts of what happened in the aftermath of 
the March 29th presidential elections stating that “by all reliable accounts, 
Zimbabwe’s military quietly seized control and subverted the democratic process 
in the immediate aftermath of the first round of the March 29 presidential 
election.” Among a number of accounts of what was actually happening behind 
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the scenes during the delay in releasing the results, they have documented that 
“there are credible reports that, on March 30, Mugabe informed his security 
chiefs that he had lost the presidential vote and intended to surrender power. 
However, Constantine Chiwenga, now commander of the ZDF—backed by police 
chief Augustine Chihuri, air force head Perence Shiri, and director of prisons 
Paradzai Zimondi—allegedly vetoed this proposal.” According to their report, 
Chihuri, Shiri and Zimondi insisted that Mugabe remain in office, either openly 
with military backing or by contesting a runoff election, “the campaign for which 
would be run as yet another JOC operation. Code-named Operation Mavhotera 
Papi (“How Did You Vote?”), it would root out and target for retaliation all those 
suspected of casting a ballot for the MDC in the first round.” (Bratton &  
Masunungure, 2008 pp.49 - 50) Eventually, it was decided that Mugabe would 
participate in a runoff and that the JOC would play an integral role in the process. 
  
Internal ZANU-PF documents confirm that the JOC security 
chiefs (‘with the party chairing’) were in charge of logistics and 
operations in the runoff election of June 2008. ZANU-PF’s strategy 
for the runoff election was ‘electoral cleansing.’ The objective was 
to kill MDC officials and polling agents, displace qualified electoral 
officials such as schoolteachers, and punish known MDC 
supporters. The targets of intimidation were not so much the solid 
MDC strongholds in the cities and the southwest, but politically 
contested areas in the country’s middle belt and northeast where, in 
the first round of the election, voters had swung away from 
ZANUPF and toward the MDC. The object of electoral cleansing 
was to create ‘no-go zones’ (note again the guerrilla-insurgency 
terminology) where the ZANU-PF monopoly could be enforced at 
the local level through the direct and demonstration effects of 
violence. As further punishment, the party ordered food relief to be 
withheld from opposition sympathizers and commercial food 
supplies to be distributed only to shops operated by ZANU-PF 
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supporters or personnel. The combination of physical intimidation 
and the denial of basic needs to MDC supporters meant that, in the 
words of a Shamva villager, ‘only ZANU-PF people will vote. There 
are no opposition supporters. It will be a big advantage for them.’ 
(Bratton & Masunungure, 2008 pp. 51- 52) 
 
Although the perception of ‘contested elections’ can serve the purpose of 
demonstrating the incumbent’s dominance, when the incumbent party has no 
intention of giving up power, then we are unable to declare these elections 
democratic. As we have seen, since 2000, Zimbabwe has held five elections with 
increasingly questionable results. Under the guise of democracy, elections are 
often held within authoritarian regimes such as Zimbabwe. In Democracy and 
Development, Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, J.A. Cheibub and Fernando 
Limongi look at the democratic requirements for elections by discussing three 
features required for true democratic elections. This framework is useful in 
looking at Mugabe’s electoral victories since 2000 and whether it was simply an 
exercise to promote the façade of democracy. 
 The authors argue that countries who are recently struggling to 
establish democratic institutions are being judged on whether or not they have 
contestation. Contestation is defined as “whether or not divergent political forces 
would be able to compete for governmental offices and to assume office if they 
won.” Contestation entails three features: 1) ex-ante uncertainty, 2) ex-post 
irreversibility, and 3) repeatability. 
Did the elections have ex-ante uncertainty? For instance, Przeworski’s 
theory classifies democracy as a system in which incumbent parties actually lose 
elections. Was there a possible chance that the ruling body within Zimbabwe was 
willing to give up power? As mentioned above, according to reports, Mugabe was 
willing to give up power but his decision was vetoed by members of the JOC. If 
this is true, it is an indication of the increasing power of the shrinking inner circle 
or what the selectorate theory calls, the ‘winning coalition’. Up to the most recent 
elections, there was very little indication that Mugabe was willing to give up 
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power considering the lengths to which his coalition went to manipulate and 
intimidate. We now see the winning coalition’s desire to retain power in order to 
protect the benefits of their position within the winning coalition. This topic will be 
discussed in more detail in the following chapters.  
Did the elections have ex-post irreversibility? Was the winner of the 
election able to assume office? Un-democratic elections are held if the opposition 
wins but the incumbent government has no intention of allowing them to take 
power. In a campaign speech being covered by media, the rhetoric of Mugabe 
led to much speculation as to whether the opposition would be able to take 
power if they did indeed win. The report stated: “the opposition Movement for 
Democratic Change will ‘never rule Zimbabwe’ in a weekend speech that -
followed a pledge to arm war veterans and send them to fight in the event of an 
MDC victory.”(Wallis, 2008, June 15). This is further supported by the 
observations of Bratton and Masunungure who noted that: 
 
As in any electoral-authoritarian regime, competitive 
elections in Zimbabwe serve the useful purpose of demonstrating 
the incumbent’s dominance, but only so long as the opposition can 
never win. Over time, it has become clear that the ZANU-PF cadres 
will never recognize an opposition victory at the polls or surrender 
control of a government that they regard as belonging indisputably 
to themselves alone. (2008, p.43)  
 
Finally, can the elections be repeated? A key feature of democratic 
elections is that they must be repeated. Whoever wins the current round of 
elections cannot make it impossible for the competing forces to win it the next 
time. “Democracy as Linz (1984) put it, is government is pro tempore. All political 
outcomes must be temporary: Losers do not forfeit the right to compete in the 
future, to negotiate again, to influence legislation, to pressure the bureaucracy, or 
to seek recourse to courts.” (Przeworski, 2000, p.18)  
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Xolela Mangcu, convenor of the Platform for Public Deliberation at the 
University of Johannesburg, describes political outcomes as such:  
 
The coming into being of a new class of political insiders 
always leaves in its wake a new set of political outsiders. Those 
outsiders will in their turn be insiders, also leaving in their wake a 
new set of outsiders, and so on. This is the historical cycle by which 
political communities are created. The challenge is never to prevent 
or fear such cycles but to understand that in democratic politics 
there are neither permanent insiders nor permanent outsiders but a 
constant displacement of political actors by others through peaceful 
means. (Mangcu, 2008) 
 
These conditions of democratic elections appear to have little relevance in 
Robert Mugabe’s world. After 28 years in power with electoral victories clouded 
by accusations of violence, intimidation and murder, Zimbabwe appears to have 
witnessed anything but democracy especially since 2000. 
Why did Mugabe bother to hold elections at all? According to Andrew 
Norman the answer in part, as will be confirmed time and time again, was that 
this presented Mugabe with the ideal chance to identify his opponents, whom he 
could then persecute. (2008) This observation is not to be ignored and coincides 
with Bratton & Masunungure’s reported Operation Mavhotera Papi (“How Did 
You Vote?”). After the 2008 elections and as early as June 2008, over 50 
Zimbabweans had been killed, at least 2,000 injured, and over 30,000 displaced 
as a result of widespread post-election violence, including state-sponsored 
violence. Due to these and other events, and out of concern for the lives of his 
MDC supporters, Tsvangirai announced in late June that he would not contest 
the runoff election. Voters went to the polls on June 27, and Mugabe was 
inaugurated for a new term as president on June 29. (US State Department) 
Alois Mlambo provides more support for this theory. Shortly after the 2005 
elections the government began Operation Murambatsvina (also known as 
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Operation Restore Order), supposedly to clean up the country of vendors and 
flea-market traders, illegal structures, illegal business enterprises, and criminal 
activities. (Vambe, 2008) Mlambo believes that all the crisis and political hardball 
by Zanu PF can be credited to the political opposition and its somewhat 
respectable showing in the elections from 2000. 
 
…the historical background to Murambatsvina, emphasizing 
the failure of the government to live up to its earlier promise of 
providing health, education and housing for all by 2000 due to a 
number of factors, among which the poor performance of the 
national economy must rank very highly, especially in the aftermath 
of ESAP, which left the Zimbabwean economy worse off than 
before. The economy was dealt yet another severe blow by the 
farm invasions of 2000 and beyond, which made Zimbabwe a 
pariah state shunned by the West, led to capital and skills flight, the 
closure of local industries, growing unemployment and 
uncontrollable inflation levels that reduced a once vibrant country 
regarded as the region’s breadbasket into a basket case. The rise 
of a strong political opposition movement in 1999 followed by its 
strong showing in the subsequent national elections so incensed 
and threatened the ruling party that it reacted in ways that 
eventually proved destructive to its citizens. Murambatsvina is clear 
evidence of this. (Mlambo,2008, p. 21) 
  
A UN Special Envoy sent to Zimbabwe to assess the scope and impact of 
Operation Murambatsvina estimated that some 700,000 people nationwide lost 
their homes, their source of livelihood, or both. Families and traders, especially at 
the beginning of the operation, were often given no notice before police 
destroyed their homes and businesses. Others were able to salvage some 
possessions and building materials but often had nowhere to go, despite the 
government's statement that people should be returning to their rural homes. 
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Thousands of families were left unprotected in the open in the middle of 
Zimbabwe's winter. (US State Dept) The operation continued into July 2005, 
when the government began a program to provide housing for the newly 
displaced. As of September 2007, housing construction fell far short of demand, 
and there were reports that beneficiaries were mostly civil servants and ruling 
party loyalists, not those displaced. The government campaign of forced 
evictions continued in 2006, 2007, and 2008 albeit on a lesser scale. (US State 
Dept)  
David Moore, Professor of Development Studies at the University of 
Johannesburg, considers that Murambatsvina was a continuation of the 
government’s inability to deal with its citizens. 
 
 Rather than being perceived as a sudden and almost 
inexplicable eruption of violence and terror on behalf of a ruling 
party shocked at its recent loss of legitimacy and inability to deal 
with economic crisis, Operation Murambatsvina should be seen as 
an almost logical extension of the techniques of a party that has 
consistently failed to rule Zimbabwe through consent rather than 
force or its possibility. (2008, p.25) 
 
For its part, the Mugabe regime defended the operation by describing the 
operation as an attempt to provide decent housing to the population although 
they have yet to deliver any new housing for the forcibly removed people. In a 
report released by Amnesty International, the promise by the government was 
not honored long after the destruction: 
 
 One year after the mass forced evictions, Amnesty 
International returned to Zimbabwe to investigate what, if any, 
action had been taken by the Zimbabwean government to restore 
the human rights of the hundreds of thousands of victims of 
Operation Murambatsvina.  
  Kevin Colbourne – Masters Research Paper 
 42 
 The findings… reveal that contrary to government 
statements almost none of the victims of Operation Murambatsvina 
have benefited from the rebuilding, with only some 3,325 houses 
constructed -- compared to the 92,460 homes destroyed during 
Operation Murambatsvina -- and construction has ground to a halt 
in many areas. (Amnesty International, 2006) 
  
As we have seen, since 2000, the military began to play an increasingly 
larger role in the strategic governing of Zimbabwe. With the emergence of the 
MDC as a viable opposition, Mugabe engaged the military and security forces in 
the political arena.  
  
The party deployed state-security agencies to provide 
transport and logistical support to war veterans and other land 
invaders. The police, increasingly infiltrated by intelligence agents 
charged with enforcing loyalty to the party-state, actively harassed 
and impeded the main opposition party during “the long election 
campaign” between June 2000 and March 2002. In May 2001, 
army commander Constantine Chiwenga toured the barracks to 
mobilize electoral support for Mugabe; he warned that no soldier 
should ever take orders from MDC presidential candidate Morgan 
Tsvangirai or any other leader who had not fought in the liberation 
war.  (Bratton & Masunungure,2008 p.48) 
  
Of course the intimidation tactics and violent actions by the Mugabe 
regime required the use of the military either directly or indirectly. The following 
electoral tactics which started in 2000 and outlined in Zimbabwe’s Plunge could 
only be successful with the backing of the JOC. 
  
applying fierce intimidation – including murder, torture and 
kidnapping – to thwart opposition votes here; shaving the tally from 
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MDC strongholds by disallowing voter registration there; refusing 
access to election observers here; deploying police in a biased way 
there; getting rural headmen to disqualify or intimidate pro-MDC 
voters here; refusing youth the vote there; distorting political 
perceptions through the state-owned media (especially radio) here; 
prohibiting alternative radio and arresting private journalists there; 
detaining the opposition leader here; gerrymandering voting 
districts there; submitting bogus votes by overseas troops here; 
preventing votes by exiled Zimbabweans there. (Bond & Manyanya, 
2002, p.76)  
 
We can therefore see that the governing of Zimbabwe came down to the 
ruling party and the security forces. These are two key organs of power which 
Bratton and Masunungure characterize as a “militarized form of electoral 
authoritarianism”. (2008, p. 42) 
 This new prominent role for the military in the Zimbabwean regime has 
created the existence of a persistent use of violence against its own people in 
order to maintain power. Mugabe and Zanu PF continues to associate 
themselves with a war against the colonizers and therefore continue to capitalize 
on their success as liberators and their armed struggle against Rhodesia 
believing that they are the only ones who can lead Zimbabwe. This reign at all 
costs has led the country to economic disaster through mismanagement and the 
need to use the resources to co-pt key allegiances through patronage positions, 
corruption, pensions and pay-outs to angry war veterans. The redistribution of 
wealth became a key resource for government patronage and pay-offs. 
 
 Over time, however, the benefits of economic redistribution 
became concentrated in the upper echelons of the party-state. 
Cabinet ministers, senior civil servants, security-force commanders, 
senior judges, and ZANU-PF parliamentarians were awarded the 
best properties confiscated from commercial farmers. These 
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political insiders also gained privileged access to scarce foreign-
currency funds at artificially low official exchange rates. The military 
brass developed a taste for political plunder as they accumulated 
vast streams of wealth from mining concessions or trading and 
transport contracts secured through Zimbabwe’s armed intervention 
in the Congo War of 1998–2003. (Bratton and Masunungure, 2008, 
p. 46) 
 
 This theory of economic disaster however is not accepted by all. Brendan 
Stone (2008) believes that the economic sanctions imposed by the west caused 
unemployment to rise to over 70 percent are often overlooked by Western 
academics and journalists. They prefer to portray the crisis solely as a result of 
land reform or Mugabe’s mismanagement.  Andrew Meldrum would partly agree 
that land reform was not entirely the fault of Mugabe: 
 
There is more than enough blame to go around on all sides 
in Zimbabwe’s land controversy. White farmers refused to accept 
that large-scale redistribution was needed. Donors who were aware 
of the simmering problem did not take an early lead in persuading 
the government to revise and continue with their plans. But the 
largest share of the blame must be apportioned to the government 
for losing interest in effective land reforms. It only returned to the 
issue when it thought it could make money or political capital out of 
it. (2005, p.135) 
 It appears that the land reforms were one area where Mugabe hoped to 
gain political capitol due to political desperation. The economic crisis and the 
Mugabe regime’s resistance to give up power despite the economic and moral 
desecration of Zimbabwean society has lead to the violence, oppression and the 
rewarding of loyalty all at the expense of the vast majority of the population. Not 
surprisingly, under such circumstances we see an increasingly isolated regime 
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unable to keep the masses happy and needing to inflict severe punishment and 
oppression to those who dare speak up against them. This increased violence, 
intimidation and life threatening hardship has spread to all sectors of the 
population causing Mugabe’s much needed winning coalition and selectorate to 
decrease in size and become members of the disenfranchised sector of the 
population. For an autocrat, relying on electoral rigging, this does not bode well 
for the continued survival of an authoritarian regime.  
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Chapter 4 
Analysis of a dictator – A theoretical perspective 
This chapter will look into the patterns of behavior of authoritarian 
governments. The document analysis of theoretical perspectives provides a 
framework of analysis of authoritarian governments and how they maintain 
power.  In particular, this chapter will closely examine the issues of loyalty, 
oppression and electoral processes. The documentation researched helps to 
place Mugabe and the actions that enabled him to maintain power through co-
option, corruption, oppression and violence in context. The background to 
Mugabe’s coming to power and his subsequent 28 year reign provided in the 
previous two chapters can be further explored through this chapter’s analysis of 
authoritarian government theory.  
It is a commonly held belief that every political leader wants to keep their 
job. In The Logic of Political Survival we see that the authors begin with the view 
that every political leader faces the challenge of how to hold onto his or her job 
and that “everyone in a position of authority wants to keep that authority and that 
it is the maneuvering to do so that is central to politics in any type of regime.” 
(2003, p. 9) Obviously, we can then infer that all incumbent leaders have rivals 
and “the competition for political office has always been fierce.” (2003, p.16) 
This competition results in the need for loyalty among key backers within a 
leadership circle. This key group is what Bueno de Mesquita et al. refers to as 
the winning coalition. They are the subset of the larger selectorate3 whose 
support is essential if the incumbent is to remain in power. The authors look into 
the need for leaders to take care of their backers to ensure loyalty at least for the 
time being. It is necessary to take care of key backers who have the ability to 
remove the leaders if they so desire. The authors state that “leaders working 
under institutional arrangements correlated with authoritarianism are wise to 
establish special privileges for their backers like the special stores party 
members enjoyed in the Soviet Union.  Doling out special privileges often is vital 
to their political survival. Autocrats can be forgiven bad policy, but they are not 
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likely to survive the elimination of patronage or the corrupt benefits of cronyism.” 
(2003, p. 19) 
However, taking care of their backers goes hand in hand with the leader’s 
opportunity to not only serve their country but it also “holds out the prospects of 
great personal aggrandizement.” (2003, p. 22) The authors believe that “the 
behavior of the leader arises from their own self-interest in holding their positions. 
If that coincides with or is compatible with the welfare of the citizenry, many will 
benefit. If the welfare of a leader and the welfare of the society are at odds – our 
theory and data will indicate that they often are – it is more likely to go well for the 
leader than for society.” (2003, p. 21) For Mugabe, is his behavior due to this 
self-interest or sense of entitlement? Either-or, the affects on the welfare of the 
society appear to remain the same. 
Before continuing, let us examine definitions of the groups involved within 
political leadership sphere as they appear in The Logic of Political Survival. 
  
All polities consist of three nested and changeable groups, 
as well as a national leadership and prospective substitute leaders, 
referred to here as the challenger. The largest of the three nested 
groups is the set of all residents within the state. Within this set of 
people there is a smaller group that has a formal role in expressing 
a preference over the selection of the leadership that rules them, 
though their expression of preference may or may not directly 
influence the outcome. We call this group the selectorate (Shirk 
1993). Each member of the selectorate has some chance, albeit 
the probability may be small, of becoming an essential supporter of 
the incumbent. We call the subset of the selectorate whose support 
is essential if the incumbent is to remain in power, the winning 
coalition.  When we say these backers of the leadership are 
essential, we mean that they control the resources vital to the 
political survival of the incumbent. If enough members of the 
winning coalition defect to a rival politician, the incumbent loses 
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office. The smallest set of individuals is the leadership, which 
actually makes decisions about gathering and allocating resources. 
(2003, p. 38) 
 
The question then arises, who becomes the key member within the 
leaders circle or part of the winning coalition? According to Bueno de Mesquita et 
al., this is based on the concept of affinity. The authors explain affinity as the 
“idea that there are bonds between leaders and followers that both can use to 
anticipate each other’s future loyalty.”(2003, p. 60)  They continue that these 
factors that influence affinity “may be clustered, as in ethnic or religious 
preferences, or they may be tied to tastes about personality, ideology, political-
party identification, experience, family ties, charisma, or what have you.” (2003 p. 
61) Basically, however, a leader would prefer to form coalitions with people that 
they like rather than dislike and with people who inherently like them. (2003, p. 
61) Thus, people they have an affinity with. Interestingly, when discussing 
affinities, the authors look at societies that have a rigged electoral system such 
Zimbabwe.  
 
This is, we believe, the key characteristic of lumpy or 
correlated affinities. They create bloc leaders – essential coalition 
members - who collectively deliver the requisite number of 
nominal coalition members-who reduce the size of the actual 
winning coalition….This means that a candidate who can gain a 
group leader’s support can count on the group leader to deliver a 
bloc of votes, a phenomenon especially common in settings in 
which patron-client relations are strong. Such a circumstance 
makes it relatively inexpensive to buy support among a few 
members of large groups, thereby ensuring the reality of a small 
winning coalition with the appearance of dependence on a large 
coalition. (2003, p.64)  
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 In Zimbabwe, accusations of such processes are rampant. Government or 
party officials from within the President’s inner circle are organized to deliver the 
votes. Martin Meredith writes of large numbers of Zanu-PF supporters and war 
veterans being sent to towns to intimidate voters. In one district during a mayoral 
race, one provincial governor rebuked civil servants who did not chant Zanu-PF 
slogans and stated that “All civil servants were required to chant: ‘Forward with 
Zanu-PF and President Mugabe, down with the MDC and Tsvangirai’ before 
conducting any official business with the public.” (Meredith, 2002, p.216) Reports 
of village chiefs delivering votes for the incumbent President and political party 
and having this loyalty rewarded with a new vehicle or other financial reward are 
common place. The domestic NGO, Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) 
released a report on the 2008 Harmonized and Presidential run-off elections and 
stated that in “most rural constituencies, voters were reportedly herded to polling 
stations by traditional leaders, instructed to vote for the ruling party candidate 
and also ordered to record their ballot papers' serial numbers and after polling 
give them to the local leaders.”  
 Loyalty and land reform are two intertwined issues. A 2007 Transparency 
International report on global corruption claims that the allocation of farms and 
land was mostly used to pay off high-ranking party and government officials. 
 
 There is a considerable body of evidence that indicates 
that the occupations were not spontaneous actions by land-
hungry peasants, as claimed by the government, but an 
orchestrated campaign by the ruling party, the security agencies 
and various government departments. The occupiers perpetrated 
widespread acts of violence against the commercial farmers and 
farm workers, who were seen as sympathetic to the MDC. 
Thousands of workers were driven off farms and left destitute. 
The occupiers used the farms as bases from which to hunt down 
and attack opposition supporters in rural areas. After white 
farmers were expelled, the government, which has been 
  Kevin Colbourne – Masters Research Paper 
 50 
repeatedly criticised for corruption, allocated the best land not to 
landless peasants, but to high-ranking party and government 
officials, with some acquiring several farms each. (p. 36)   
 
 This loyalty and payoff of key members such as village chiefs illustrates 
how a winning coalition can be much smaller than that which makes up the 
selectorate but still determines who the national leadership will be. Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. offers an extreme example from Kenya of a single Returning 
Officer who was able to falsify the results of an election. An election which, for 
the most part, appeared to be free and fair. It could be said that the size of 
winning coalition was “one”. One man who was able to deliver the victory. Thus, 
the loyalty of key individuals in the sphere of political survival is key.  (2003, p. 
55) 
However, it is important to note that loyalty alone is not sufficient to 
maintain political survival in such ‘small winning coalition, large selectorate 
systems’. Loyalty must also be accompanied by oppression and oppression 
accompanied by loyalty. “Make no mistake about it, no leader rules alone. Even 
the most oppressive dictators cannot survive the loss of support among their core 
constituents.” (Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003, p. 28) 
As such, oppression is another key tool of securing autocratic rule and 
according to the authors of The Logic of Political Survival, autocrats often are 
oppressors and they often stay in power because they do not hesitate to repress 
opposition and oppress their citizens.” (2003, p. 32) When societies do not have 
“orderly methods of change that revolve around the rule of law” but instead 
“prevent alterations in selection institutions by oppressing those who are 
dissatisfied with current arrangements”, (2003, p. 338) they are most commonly 
referred to as autocracies or authoritarian governments. These governments 
oppress and punish their opponents through “confiscation of their wealth and 
imprisonment, to torture and execution.” It should also be noted that oppression 
does not always have to be brutal to be effective. “Sometimes the threat of 
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exclusion from private benefits in the future is enough to deter defections from the 
winning coalition.” (2003, p. 339) 
Although leaders oppress opponents to deter threats to their leadership, 
the authors continue by explaining three separate targets and reasons for 
oppression in their theory. 
  
First, leaders may seek to punish challengers. If 
successful, a leader would not face challenges to her rule because 
rivals would be unwilling to run the risk of suffering the punishment 
if their challenges failed to displace the current leader. Second, 
leaders may seek to punish members of the selectorate who 
support a challenger. If successful, challengers would be unable to 
garner sufficient support to unseat the leader. Third, leaders may 
seek to punish the disenfranchised who might be engaged in 
revolutionary action against the regime. If repression is successful, 
a revolution could not be organized, removing this threat to the 
leaser from outside the selectorate. (2003, pp.339 -40) 
 
In the case of Zimbabwe, we are aware of Mugabe and his government 
meeting each of the three reasons for punishment within the selectorate theory. 
The arrest and beatings of opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai, harassment, 
intimidation and violence against MDC supporters and the destruction of informal 
homes and businesses in Operation Murambatsvina are just three examples of 
this. 
The theory of Bueno de Mesquita et al. continues by asking and delving 
into the answers of four related questions concerning oppression.  First, when is 
oppression useful in deterring challengers and their supporters? Second, when do 
leaders have most interest in using oppression to hold onto power? Third, when 
can leaders recruit those who will carry out the oppressive measures against 
opponents? Fourth, when is oppression likely to succeed in deterring challenges? 
(2003, p. 340) 
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First of all, according to the authors, oppression is intended to deter 
challengers by raising the costs of failure for unsuccessful opponents. Mugabe has 
successfully oppressed any serious contests from outside the winning coalition. 
Constant harassment, a brutal beating by police and the ominous assassination 
attempts against the main challenger to Mugabe, Morgan Tsvangirai, has allowed 
Mugabe to remain in power after battling several elections against the leader of the 
MDC.  
According to the selectorate theory, it is also important for authoritarian 
systems with small winning coalitions and large selectorates, to engage in the 
“most brutal and extensive oppression of prospective challengers.” (2003, p. 341) 
This was especially true in Mugabe’s post 2000 government when it became 
necessary to engage in increasingly oppressive and violent measures. These 
threats of prospective challengers to the leader may come from inside the winning 
coalition. According to the theory, a successful challenge requires the defection of 
enough members from the winning coalition in order to reduce the required number 
of members in the coalition. If that challenger is from within the winning coalition 
then he automatically begins with one member of the winning coalition, himself.  
Therefore, according to the theory, “leaders should more fiercely oppress members 
of their own winning coalition who lead challenges than other challengers.” (2003, 
p. 341) Some even argue that those close to the throne are the biggest threat to 
the leader. Mugabe has never hesitated to oppress those who he believed were 
challengers to his authority. Both Jonathon Moyo and Edgar Tekere were both 
removed from the President’s inner circle when he believed that their power and 
influence was becoming a danger to his survival.   
Furthermore, oppression is also used against possible supporters of 
challenges from within the selectorate. “Any challenger needs supporters to come 
to power, and so leaders may use oppression to deter selectors from joining the 
nascent coalition supporting a challenger.” (2003, p.341) Once a challenger is 
identified, the danger arises for a leader since members of the selectorate may be 
inclined to support a challenger if they believe that it offers some hope of entering 
the winning coalition. 
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Secondly, since a small winning coalition such as that in an authoritarian 
regime provides the leader and the few members of the coalition with resources 
normally used for the public good as in democratic systems, then the stakes of 
losing these resources are much larger for authoritarian leaders. Large winning 
coalitions such as democracies provide primarily public goods and allow the leader 
to retain only a small amount of resources for their own use. This substantial loss 
provides leaders in small winning coalitions with a strong motivation to hold on to 
office by all means necessary. (2003, p.342) As we have seen in the case of 
Zimbabwe, this strong motivation to hold on to office has led to serious oppression 
and economic collapse. 
Thirdly, leaders do not carry out oppressive measures themselves 
especially when oppression is extensive as it is expected to be in small winning-
coalition systems. (2003, p. 343)  Such extensive oppression requires the 
recruitment of a large number of people into the organs of repression whether they 
come from within the winning coalition in the form of party members and of course 
the military and police force. “The foot soldiers of oppression are more willing to do 
what it takes to protect the leader when they benefit from her rule. Members of the 
winning coalition are obvious recruits because they have an interest in protecting 
their position, so as to continue to collect their private goods.” (2003, p. 344) As in 
Zimbabwe with the military and police as key oppressors, “authoritarian systems 
must rely on the winning coalition to suppress revolution because most members 
of the selectorate are unlikely to benefit from the current system, and so will not 
fight hard to preserve it.” (2003, p. 344)  This is especially true when resources are 
limited which will also ultimately affect the size of the winning coalition. Over time, 
the size of the winning coalition in Zimbabwe has decreased to such a small 
number given the declining resources with which the leader can offer members for 
their loyalty.  It would appear from the economic situation within Zimbabwe that 
dangerous ground lays ahead for autocrats such as Mugabe who depend on 
oppression when they are no longer able to keep the military and police within their 
coalition due to a lack of resources to pay them off for their loyalty.  
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Fourthly, according to The Logic of Political Survival, oppression is 
attractive to authoritarian leaders because prospective challengers and their 
supporters find that the threat of oppression is more credible coming from them 
than from democratic leaders. “As with the three previous questions, a small 
winning coalition and large selectorate is the pattern most conducive to effective 
oppression.” (2003, p. 345) 
As examined in previous chapters, oppression in Zimbabwe is real. In a 
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum pre-election report, It’s the Count that 
Counts: Food for thought, it would appear likely that such reports of harsh and 
systemic violence around election periods would induce fear of participation among 
Zimbabweans opposing the ruling party. 
 
 In a recent series of analyses of the data contained in the 
Monthly Political Violence Reports of the Human Rights Forum, 
the Redress Trust points out that, between July 2001 and 
December 2004, the Forum identified 11,456 cases of gross 
human-rights violations. Many of these violations involved 
murder, rape and torture, which was sometimes of a sexual 
nature. The violence was systemic, co-ordinated and occurred 
in all constituencies throughout the country, with the rural areas 
being the worst effected. The violence over the documented 
period was closely indexed to election periods suggesting that it 
was as much a part of the then election strategy as is its present 
abatement. Ruling party politicians made numerous 
inflammatory statements that encouraged violence. Certainly 
nothing was done to curb its incidence. (2005, April) 
 
According to the Logic of Political Survival, systems with a small winning 
coalition and a large selectorate encourage oppression, both in intensity and 
magnitude. Within such systems there is “a greater incentive to challenge the 
leader, a greater incentive for the leader to hang onto power by all possible means, 
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a greater ability to recruit those who will carry out the threats, and greater 
credibility because of the longer tenure of their leaders.” (2003, p. 346)  As we 
have seen, this is a true reflection of the authoritarian regime within Zimbabwe. 
Oppression is also often justified as a means of protecting the country 
from the evil or oppressive forces of the opposition which are often backed by 
external forces. In reality, it is more a case of protecting the leadership, and those 
benefitting from their rule, from losing what they believe are rightly theirs to hold on 
to at any cost to the nation.   
In Zimbabwe’s Long Agony, Bratton and Masunungure state that the 
behavior of Zimbabwe’s rulers is best understood in the context of their belief that 
ZANU-PF has a right to rule in perpetuity. The ruling party’s intolerance of political 
opposition was born during the liberation struggle. Indeed, according to the 
authors, liberation politics were marked by intense intrigue, violent purges, and 
leadership assassinations. (2008)  
 Soon after independence in 1980, the supporters of Joshua 
Nkomo’s ZAPU were portrayed in the official media as ‘dissidents,’ 
and their purported armed rebellion was crushed via ethnic 
massacres in Matabeleland between 1982 and 1987. The ruling 
party later hounded presidential aspirants—Edgar Tekere in 1990 
and Morgan Tsvangirai in 2002 and 2008—with assassination plots 
or treason trials or both. In increasingly racist terms, ZANU-PF 
depicts the MDC as a stalking horse for regime change funded by 
the British, European, and U.S. governments (then–British prime 
minister Tony Blair was a favorite target) and for favoring liberal 
political and economic reforms that deny the historical contribution 
and socialist agenda of the guerrilla movement. Under the terms of 
the incongruously named Access to Information and Protection of 
Privacy Act (2002), which bans foreign journalists and outlaws 
independent publications, alternative views are restricted. 
Summarizing the party’s position on electoral competition, a 
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government propagandist urged that ‘the stampede for democracy 
should not undermine the gains of the liberation war.’ (2008, p.44)  
Statements by ZANU-PF officials and the President himself “reflect a 
persistent sense of political entitlement” according to Bratton and Masunungure. 
(2008, p.44)  Mugabe himself claimed “Only God, who appointed me, will remove 
me, not the M.D.C., not the British, Only God will remove me!” (Dugger & Bearak, 
2008) 
 Where does this sense of entitlement come from? Has it always been 
there? Not so for many of the world’s dictators. The Logic of Political Survival’ 
theory on small-coalition, large selectorate regimes, states that “we can expect 
that any time an incumbent has a fairly unconstrained opportunity to choose 
institutions, the choice will be an autocracy with a strong loyalty norm.” (2003, 
p.378) The authors correctly note that this choice was made by Fidel Castro, 
Mao Zedong, Ho chi Minh, and many other victorious revolutionary leaders 
despite their earlier declarations of support for democracy. “The selectorate 
theory leads us to infer, as intimated earlier, that the pro-democracy declarations 
were sincere when these revolutionary leaders were outsiders, but their 
incentives shifted once they became insiders.” (2003, p. 378) In our case study, 
Mugabe was one of those leaders. In the initial years of the regime much 
attention was given to the health and education sectors. “He took an already 
excellent school system and expanded it to make primary education both free 
and compulsory, extended health care and encouraged small business.” (Hill, 
2003, p.9) In more recent years, we witnessed how Mugabe’s land distribution 
program and business deals have been conducted through corruption, collusion 
and nepotism all at the expense of the national economy and the general 
population.    Once leaders have chosen this autocratic path, it appears, according to 
Bratton and Masunungure that they continue to desire the veneer of political 
legitimacy provided by managed elections and the appearance of the rule of law. 
(2008, p.52) 
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 This desire to legitimize themselves to the world and to the people is best 
described by the authors of the 2008 ZESN elections report: 
 
 The relative importance of elections in the democratization 
process is key in that the success of any democracy depends 
primarily on the conduct of participatory, competitive politics, 
particularly free and fair elections that render legitimacy to the 
incumbent. However, elections in themselves are not sufficient to 
ensure democracy because even military juntas also hold elections 
to try and buy legitimacy from their victims. Electoral experiences, 
especially in Africa, suggest their potential double-edged nature. 
On one hand, by organizing periodic elections, governments create 
some semblance of democratic legitimacy and at the same time, by 
placing those elections under tight authoritarian controls, they try to 
cement their continued hold on power. Their dream is to reap the 
fruits of electoral legitimacy without running the risks of democratic 
uncertainty. Balancing between electoral control and electoral 
credibility, governments situate themselves in a nebulous zone of 
structural ambivalence. (2008, p.1) 
 
 How do these rigged electoral systems fit into the Logic of Political 
Survival theory? According to the authors, it is common in rigged electoral 
systems to create a false sense of belonging to a political party. In the former 
Soviet Union, it was membership in the Communist Party. In Zimbabwe it is the 
admittance to the liberation fighting Zanu-PF party that gives people the hope of 
eventually becoming a member of the inner circle or winning coalition. 
Supporters of such governments also tend to be particularly loyal because the 
risk and cost of exclusion if the challenger comes to power are high. (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al, 2003) This desire to belong leads to a large selectorate. However, 
the leader still manages to limit the number within winning coalition.  
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 All rigged electoral systems create artificial scarcity in some 
designated proficiency, typically in membership in the single 
approved political party, thereby guaranteeing that membership is 
valuable. As in the Soviet system, so too in virtually all rigged 
systems, any selectorate member could be granted the opportunity 
to gain the requisite additional qualities to make it into the winning 
coalition, but to protect the value of those additional qualities, only 
very few actually are given that opportunity. The consequence of 
this choice of selectorate members for entry into a winning coalition 
is that many people are candidates for entry into a winning 
coalition, but only a tiny subset are chosen. Thus rigged electoral 
systems have a large selectorate and a small winning coalition. 
(Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003, p. 54) 
 
 Since 2000, Mugabe has been able to rule by mobilising his supporters in 
land grabs, intimidating and killing MDC members, driving thousands of informal 
settlement dwellers into the rural areas, using anti-colonial rhetoric and purging 
his own party of any threats. However, the recent political defeat in the March 
2008 harmonized elections, despite the rigged electoral system, threatened the 
regime to such a degree that the country was taken over by the civilian-military 
junta which effectively blocked any form of democracy in Zimbabwe and enforced 
a Mugabe landslide in the June runoff through violence and intimidation. Even 
further undermining the legitimacy of his authoritarian rule. 
 Even though the leadership within Zimbabwe followed the text book 
pattern of behavior of authoritarian governments they were still unable to rig the 
2008 harmonized elections in their favor. Through fierce oppression against 
proclaimed and perceived opponents and blatant payoffs to key loyalists within 
the winning coalition, the leadership was still unable to secure a majority in 
parliament or a first place finish for the president, the leader of the liberation 
movement. This obviously weakens the chances of political survival of 
authoritarian leadership and may serve to increase the number and strength of 
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potential challengers to the leader. Chapter five will explore the issue of potential 
challenges to authoritarian rule.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Challenges to a leader 
 
 The power sharing deal in September 2008 was the first crack to appear 
in the armor of the father of the liberation movement. For the very first time in 
Zimbabwe’s history, Robert Mugabe had to share the stage with someone who 
had won an election against him.  Someone that he has repeatedly vilified in 
speeches, in his own media and in countless exchanges with SADC and the AU 
over the years.  Moreover, he did this in front of a host of leaders from the 
region.  And in doing so, the myth that he alone is the only leader of Zimbabwe 
was shattered.  Although more and more Zimbabweans have been coming to this 
realization for a while, leaders in SADC and the AU have taken more time to 
appreciate it. Even this small crack in the armor has been long overdue in the 
minds of many Zimbabweans.  In 2006, a Helen Suzman Foundation poll 
indicated there was an opposition majority within the Zimbabwean electorate of 
over 60 per cent but as in previous elections, voting behavior may be affected by 
violence and intimidation. (Johnson, 2007) 
 Why has Mugabe been able to survive for so long given the vast 
majority’s unhappiness with his rule and the crumbling state of the 
economy which has lead to Zimbabwe bordering perilously close to 
becoming a failed state? Where is the opposition and those willing to 
replace him in order to improve conditions for those outside of Mugabe’s 
winning coalition? 
Samuel Huntington asserts that despite the causes and negative effects of 
authoritarian governments on a society, this does not always translate into a 
democratic transition. According to Huntington, “democracies are created not by 
causes but by causers.” (1991, p.107) This begs the question: Has Mugabe been 
able to sustain power due to the lack of strong “causers” or political opponents? 
In fact, many in the media have praised Morgan Tsvangirai for his courage but 
have been less generous when opining about his intellectual ability to unseat a 
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seasoned dictator. (Dugger, 2008) Will any possible replacement of Mugabe hold 
the determination, strength and wisdom to hold off the current political and power 
elite who are in positions of privilege and do not want to see these positions 
weakened. Bratton and Masunungure note in Zimbabwe’s Long Agony that if a 
more democratic system is ever installed in Zimbabwe, they will “face enormous 
challenges in neutralizing the power of politicized and militarized elements that 
have thoroughly penetrated the state.” (2008, pp. 42–43)  
Despite the upcoming challenges to possible democratic replacements, 
the ability of Morgan Tsvangirai to be that replacement is doubted by many 
observers. Several sources in the media have been critical of Tsvangirai through 
editorial and opinion pieces. In November, 2008, South Africa’s Business Day 
printed an editorial which stated: 
 
 Tsvangirai has been the author of his own misfortune in 
many respects, especially his sloppiness in signing a power-sharing 
agreement that left so much critical detail in the air. It is also 
claimed that Zanu (PF) changed key aspects of the agreement 
before the signing ceremony and that Tsvangirai failed to pick these 
up, which if true is a severe indictment of his leadership ability. 
(2008, November 11) 
 
 According to The Logic of Political Survival, a challenge for the challenger 
will always be the ability to guarantee that the prospective defectors will always 
be members of his winning coalition. The difficulty of this however is what the 
authors claim is a substantial advantage for the incumbent leader. (2003, p. 60) 
Similarly, however, it is also necessary for the incumbent leader to have the 
ability and the resources necessary to maintain the support of essential backers. 
 In the case of Zimbabwe however, the dilemma associated for Mr. 
Mugabe in the recent power sharing agreement could weaken his ability to hold 
on to members of his winning coalition as there will likely be strings attached to 
donor funds which would make it very difficult for him to continue the patronage 
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and payoff system. According to William Wallis of the Financial Times, we may 
be seeing the second crack in the armor. 
 
 …access to patronage including US dollars at the 
discounted official exchange rate, has become increasingly 
centralized at the reserve bank. Should Mr. Mugabe lose control of 
this, he might struggle to hold his support base together. (2008, 
Oct. 28)  
 
 If these are cracks in the armor, let us look at other challenges that would 
threaten the political survival of a dictator. According to Bueno de Mesquita et al. 
political survival can be threatened in three distinct ways. These include domestic 
challenges to leadership, revolutionary challenges to individual leaders and the 
political systems they lead, and external threats in the form of military attack by 
foreign adversaries.  
 In Zimbabwe, we have seen the domestic challenges faced by Mugabe 
through the opposition parties especially the MDC and its leader Morgan 
Tsvangirai, but also via powerful former members of the inner elite such as 
Simba Makoni, the former Finance Minister and a presidential candidate in the 
2008 elections. As for the other two threats, given the dire state of affairs in 
Zimbabwe, one can imagine the possibility of a revolution but there has been 
little or no threat of military attacks by foreign adversaries especially given the 
fact that Mugabe is supported by members of the African Union or there is a lack 
of will and means to take such action. (Georgy, 2008)  
The authors of The Logic of Political Survival note that people can act in 
one of three basic ways to improve their relationship between their institutional 
preferences or what they expect from government and their institutional 
experience, what they actually experience.  
 
They can try to alter the institutions where they live. This can 
be done through mechanisms ranging from the relatively benign to 
  Kevin Colbourne – Masters Research Paper 
 63 
the extremely aggressive. For instance, institutions can be altered 
through such peaceful means as constitutional amendments on up 
through such aggressive measures as revolution, assassination, or 
coup d’etat. Alternatively, people discontent with the institutional 
arrangements can migrate to another country with a winning 
coalition and selectorate more in line with their own preferences. 
Finally, individuals can be disgruntled about their institutions but 
take no action, showing patience while they wait for circumstances 
to change and improve their lot. (2003, p. 354) 
 
In systems such as that which exist in Zimbabwe, small winning coalition 
and large selectorate, we know that such peaceful means such as changes to 
the constitution or even democratic elections are not common ways of changing 
the institutional arrangements and their place in them. As we have seen in 
previous chapters, with the exception of the constitutional referendum in 2000, 
the use of oppression and loyalty combined with a rigged electoral system does 
not provide such means of change with much success. Revolutions are one way 
in which autocrats are often disposed of however. For clarity purposes, the 
authors refer to revolutions as attempts by the disenfranchised to overthrow the 
system. (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, p. 368) That is, those who have been 
excluded from the winning coalition and the selectorate. “The selectorate theory 
suggests that revolutionaries are motivated by the intention to overthrow the 
existing political order so that the excluded (i.e., the revolutionaries and their 
followers) become the included.” (2003, p. 368) The selectorate has two 
advantages in a revolutionary struggle. First, those defending the current 
institutions possess an advantage in the tools and skills of violence. As we 
discussed earlier, the military and police have been a critical component of 
Mugabe’s selectorate. The leaders of the military command are also within 
Mugabe’s winning coalition which has helped to ensure the loyalty of the armed 
and police forces. The intimidating forces within the selectorate are indeed a 
  Kevin Colbourne – Masters Research Paper 
 64 
strong advantage for the leader and a dissuasive factor for the masses within the 
disenfranchised. 
The second advantage of the selectorate lies in its “greater ability to 
mobilize forces from its members because of an asymmetry of motivation.” 
(Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003, p. 369) Members of the disenfranchised and the 
selectorate have to weigh the benefits and cost of fighting a revolution. The 
disenfranchised may gain the benefits of the selectorate if they are successful 
but is also likely to face oppression or even death if the revolution should fail. 
Inaction by the selectorate may result in loss of privileges and even death. 
Inaction is dangerous for the selectorate and the authors conclude that “passivity 
is safe for the disenfranchised. The opposite is true for the selectorate.” (2003, p. 
369) This need to fight to hold on to what they have provides them with an 
advantage over a larger disenfranchised group who may also not be as 
organized. 
In cases such as Zimbabwe, with small-coalition systems which are 
undoubtedly getting smaller as the ability of the leader to provide incentives to 
their winning coalition dwindles, they are doubly vulnerable to revolution. Bueno 
de Mesquita et al. states that when coalition size is small, there are many 
outsiders from which to draw revolutionaries. Second, small-coalition systems 
produce few rewards for outsiders, giving these potential revolutionaries cause to 
rebel. As we are aware, the selectorate, and especially the winning coalition, are 
greatly favored within such systems, and so should be very willing to fight for it 
since they have a lot to lose. (2003, p. 370) The threat of losing these special 
privileges ensures the use of violent and oppressive measures to protect what 
they have. Thus, we see the importance of civil-military relations.  
 
In small winning-coalition systems, the military must 
be part of the selectorate to protect the system against 
revolutionary threats. Consequently, the military cannot be 
separated from politics in such systems. In large winning 
coalitions (such as democratic systems), though, the military 
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is not needed to protect the system against revolutionary 
threats, and so can be professionalized and removed from 
politics. (2003, p. 372)  
 
Chapter three provided a background to the increasing role of the military 
in Zimbabwe which became even more apparent after the first round of 
harmonized elections in March 2008. We can therefore see that given the 
prominent role of the military in the winning coalition, revolutions have yet to play 
a role in the removal of Mugabe.  
In a similar vein, the disenfranchised who do not participate in revolutions 
may for the same reasons migrate to another country with a winning coalition and 
selectorate more in line with their own preferences or those who are unhappy 
with their political institutions may not take any action and simply wait for 
circumstances to change and have their lot in life improved. We can see that this 
option is favored among many in Zimbabwe by the number of Zimbabweans who 
have crossed the border into South Africa seeking a better life while also 
escaping the oppressive political environment in their home country. A June 2008 
Human Rights Watch report stated: 
 
The recent arrival in South Africa of Zimbabweans fleeing 
political violence is only the latest wave of forced migration that 
includes tens of thousands of refugees who escaped mass forced 
evictions in 2005. Hundreds of thousands more left to escape 
economic deprivation and systematic violation of core social and 
economic rights caused by President Robert Mugabe’s destruction 
of the Zimbabwean economy during the past three years. (p.1) 
 
Again, the threat of systematic oppression of anyone critical of the 
government would also mean that those who are unhappy and suffering would 
be inclined to wait for things to improve rather than risk making their lives even 
more miserable by criticizing the government. The fact of the matter is anyone 
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involved in any opposition movement within Zimbabwe appears to be at risk. In a 
2002 report from the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, the vast majority of 
victims of violence stated that they were actually involved or suspected to have 
been involved with the opposition party. 
  
Of the victims who reported to the human-rights 
organisations, 51% stated that they were active members of the 
MDC and that their membership was the basic reason for the 
crimes committed against them. A further 32% stated that they 
were not active members of the MDC: they either had no 
connection with the party or were merely related to someone who 
was. However of this 32% stated that the crimes committed 
against them were related to accusations about their possible 
MDC membership. Another 20% did not raise MDC membership 
as a reason for their violation, but in this group were farm 
workers, persons accused of crimes and persons who got into 
disputes with the police. (2002, August) 
 
 Therefore, revolution is not a likely course of action due to the 
consequences of a failed attempt and thus, the winning coalition continues to 
rule. It would then be assumed that as the winning coalition becomes smaller, 
which we believe is happening in Zimbabwe given the lack of resources required 
to ensure the loyalty of those around the leader and ensure that there is enough 
to go around, the issue of how to reduce the size of the winning coalition is dealt 
with by means of purges. The term purge, as used by the authors refers to “the 
elimination of members of the winning coalition or the selectorate or both”. 
(Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003, p.383) Leaders often want to purge from the 
winning coalition so they can reduce the amount they must spend on the 
remaining members and also, as we have seen earlier in this paper, purges may 
take place to eliminate perceived threats to the leader such as the purging of 
Moyo and Tekere, and also to reduce the size of the winning coalition to ensure 
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that there are enough resources for those remaining in the winning coalition. 
Purges can also take place by members of the winning coalition who prefer to 
reduce the coalition’s size, purging individuals (other than themselves, of course) 
from coalition membership. This again can improve the welfare of those who 
remain in the coalition. (2003, p. 382) The reduction in the winning coalition 
improves the chances of the leader’s political survival as long as there are key 
members still within the winning coalition. In Zimbabwe for example, the leaders 
of the military and police forces are key to the leadership’s political survival and 
must remain in the coalition. 
 As mentioned earlier, purges also exist to reduce the chance of a 
challenger coming from within the winning coalition. This can be referred to as a 
coup d’etat which the authors believe is an “appealing strategy for members of 
the winning coalition who want to give voice to their discontent.” (2003, p. 397) 
However, according to the selectorate theory, coups do not occur with a large 
winning coalition and they do occur when the welfare of the coalition members is 
poor. As noted earlier, all economic indications in Zimbabwe appear to be 
suggesting that Mugabe’s ability to provide resources to his dwindling winning 
coalition members is becoming seriously compromised. This would therefore 
suggest that perhaps Mugabe’s most serious threat to his political survival would 
be from his winning coalition.   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Chapter 6 
 
Conclusion  
In searching for the reason of how authoritarian powers are able to 
survive and in particular, how Robert Mugabe has been able to continue his reign 
of power for such a long time despite the failing state of the nation, we have 
discovered that the keys to maintaining power are loyalty and oppression. This 
loyalty and oppression are able to ensure favorable election results, quell 
revolutions and silence critics through intimidation or forcing them to migrate to 
other lands. Prospective challengers from within the selectorate or winning 
coalition are purged and the essential mix of key backers necessary for the 
political survival of the leader are held within the winning coalition. 
This paper has focused on the years from 2000 to 2008 as a period of 
increased, intense and brutal oppression and election rigging. According to David 
Moore (2005) in the paradoxically titled piece ‘When I am a century old’: why 
Robert Mugabe won’t go, the creation of the MDC in 1999 and the Zimbabweans 
rejection of the constitutional referendum in 2000 brought a sense of the end for 
ZANU-PF and Mugabe.  The pressure was on and Mugabe decided to release 
the war vets and really begin to ensure that ZANU-PF would not lose another 
contest at the polls. The results of this ‘win at all costs’ governance was 
grotesque. Moore notes that between 2000 to mid -2004 there were “128 
murders, 37 attempted murders, 3 849 incidents of torture, 619 abductions and 
kidnappings, 2 042 arrests and detentions, 712 assaults, 259 displacements, 26 
rapes, 33 disappearances, and 190 death threats all committed in the cause of 
ZANU-PF’s continuing leadership.” (2005, p. 131). As we discussed in chapter 3, 
this brutality and intimidation continued throughout the end of 2008.  
The need for loyalty among the ranks of the winning coalition and 
selectorate was also examined. Mugabe has maintained alliances with key 
figures especially within the military and security forces. This ability to hold on to 
those with the gun may be due to the idea that those who participated in the 
  Kevin Colbourne – Masters Research Paper 
 69 
liberation war are the only people entitled to rule. (Moore, 2005) However, even a 
soldier’s loyalty has its limits. In the last month of 2008, soldiers upset at not 
being paid, clashed violently with police after they started to protest in the streets 
of Harare. (Berger & Thornycroft, 2008, December 10) Dissent within the rank 
and file of the military could reduce Mugabe’s power immensely and it appears 
generous offerings are required to maintain this key element within the winning 
coalition.   
External forms of loyalty and support coming from most neighboring 
countries, with the exception of a few, such as Botswana, who lack the power 
and influence to bring about change, certainly contribute to Mugabe’s holding on 
to power. (Moore, 2005) The quiet diplomacy and non-interventionist stance of 
members of the African community is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.     
 This paper has tried to provide evidence of Mugabe’s logic of political 
survival. However, in doing so, it has provided little in defense of Mugabe’s 
actions for the latter part of his rule and has agreed with academics, political 
scientists, journalists and governments that categorize Mugabe as an 
authoritarian leader, an autocrat and a dictator. As for the state of the nation, 
most westerners have laid blame squarely on the shoulders of the father of 
liberation. There are those within Zimbabwe who undoubtedly also blame him for 
the failed economy, oppressive nature and failing social systems and 
infrastructure. Perhaps Edgar Tekere speaks for many who recognized the hero 
within but felt things were allowed to spin out of control. 
   
 The old saying rings true, that you cannot hold one 
man responsible for all of a nation’s ills. But, in Zimbabwe, it 
is becoming increasingly difficult not to believe that Robert 
Mugabe is right at the centre of the nation’s problems; in my 
view, 90 per cent of the blame should go to him, and ten per 
cent to those who have uncritically huddled around him over 
the years. (2007, p. 173)  
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This paper has also overlooked the small victories of justice and 
democracy within Zimbabwe. Brendan Stone notes several of these while 
arguing that Western sources tend to paint Zimbabwe as if the country were 
under the rule of one man, or a de-facto one-party state. He highlights several 
events between the ruling Zanu-PF and the opposition MDC that suggest 
otherwise.  
 
First, the MDC was able to severely challenge ZANU-
PF in the 2000 election. Second, the NCA movement was 
able to overturn President Mugabe's suggested 
constitutional amendments. Third, Zimbabwe's elections 
have witnessed increasing international monitoring, and 
none have been overruled by African monitoring agencies. In 
fact, Zimbabwe became the first country to modify its 
electoral structure to conform to SADC guidelines. Finally, 
the judiciary demonstrated its independence when it 
acquitted Tsvangirai of treason. (2007)  
 
The paper did begin, however, with an extensive overview of the history of 
Zimbabwe. One must reflect on the history of a nation being led by an authoritarian 
government to truly understand what has brought them to power and what keeps 
them in power. While examining the political survival of authoritarian leaders in 
general and Robert Mugabe in particular through the selectorate theory; perhaps 
this paper did not fully address colonialism and its influence on the autocratic style 
of governance of Mugabe which includes his justification of his continued 
oppressive regime in order to defend the country from further foreign intervention. 
Obviously, leaders such as Mugabe and political parties such as ZANU-PF unite its 
followers through such anti-colonial rhetoric.  
Raymond Suttner,  a professor with the University of South Africa explains 
that in a number of African countries, single parties, often derived from national 
liberation movements (NLMs) such as in Zimbabwe and in South Africa or former 
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military regimes, often hold power continually. For instance, despite the existence 
of a multiparty electoral system, governments such as the ANC in South Africa 
have endured as 'dominant' parties. Suttner correctly points out that it was such 
liberation movements that brought democracy to Africa. 
 
Colonialism was an inherently undemocratic system 
and it was the liberation struggles that ensured people voted 
for the first time. What ensued afterwards is a separate 
question and whether it was inevitable or is irreversible 
needs more than assertion but argument. (2004, p.763)  
 However, according to Suttner, these NLMs also claimed and often 
received recognition as the sole and authentic representative of particular 
peoples. Even after liberation, Suttner believes there was an inherent danger that 
many liberation movements treated post liberation elections as “constituting a 
formal confirmation of what had already been earned, and seen themselves as 
already enjoying a right of representation that had been permanently conferred.” 
(2004, p. 765) 
 This feeling of entitlement also discussed in chapter 4 has, according to 
Suttner, lead to the existence of such authoritarian states such as Zimbabwe. 
  
 This quality of being the nation, that was ascribed to 
or claimed by the parties that led countries to independence, 
became one of the bases on which one-party states were 
advanced and opposition parties systematically suppressed. 
It also became one of the reasons why NLMs, turned ruling 
parties, were reluctant to consider exiting from government, 
as in contemporary Zimbabwe. This does represent a 
tendency, but whether a tendency is irreversible or realizable 
depends on the capacity for contestation, which varies in 
different countries and situations. (2004, p. 765) 
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 The colonial past and liberation movement has undoubtedly played a 
major role in the political survival of Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF. Those within 
Zimbabwe and those on the continent who remember the colonialism inflicted 
upon countries throughout Africa see Robert Mugabe as a liberator and bringing 
democracy to the country. But the reality for many Zimbabweans today appears 
to be quite different. After 28 years of one party rule, Zimbabwe has witnessed 
increasingly oppressive actions by the government to remain in power and have 
suffered with the squandering of the country’s wealth through corruption, 
collusion and the rewarding key loyalists to the government.  
 How do authoritarian leaders, such as Mugabe, remain in power and 
circumvent the democratic process? The crux of their ability lies in the theory 
provided in this paper arguing that oppression and loyalty which manages to 
deter opposition and enables election rigging. As indicated in previous chapters, 
the unsubtle means by which Mugabe has ensured loyalties through the 
distribution of the state’s riches and has violently put down any perceived or real 
opposition has enabled him and his regime to remain in power. 
 In the end, however, what enables authoritarian governments to remain in 
power may be what has brought them to power as much as the tactics used to 
remain in power. As Suttner, Bratton and Masunungure and others in the media 
have suggested and reported, there is often a sense of entitlement that 
accompanies an authoritarian leader who has taken the seat of power through a 
liberation struggle. For some, this sense of entitlement may have come even 
before taking power. Once the sense of entitlement has been instilled in a leader, 
they are willing to do anything to hold on to what they believe is rightfully theirs. 
In her psychobiography of Mugabe, Heidi Holland reveals a portrait of a leader 
who believed that he was entitled to rule at his discretion and for as long as he 
desired. 
 
 Robert Mugabe believed he was born to rule and behaved 
accordingly. Once the king, always the king, he reckoned. In his 
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idealized view, his loyal subjects would worship the ground he trod 
forever. In reality, the great majority of Zimbabwe’s people 
supported him enthusiastically for 20 years. It was only when his 
policies began to impoverish the country that they turned against 
him. Characteristically, Mugabe never forgave them. Growing ever 
more vengeful, he ripped down their shelters, destroyed their 
livelihoods and snatched the food from their mouths. Those in his 
court who remained loyal to him were richly rewarded with money, 
property and power. In death, they were buried amid extravagant 
fanfare at Heroes Acre, the monument to Zimbabwe’s liberation 
struggle on a hill outside Harare. (2008, p.192) 
   
 Whether Zimbabweans have the capacity for contestation to reverse the 
notion of a ‘liberator being the nation’ is the issue facing the nation and region at 
the moment. The question therefore is now that we have seen how authoritarian 
leaders remain in power and circumvent the democratic process, how long will 
Mugabe enjoy this status of entitlement before even oppression and key loyalties 
are unable to ensure the political survival of the father of liberation and the 
deliverer of democracy.  
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1 As of February 11, the opposition parties began a power sharing government with 
Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara being sworn in as Prime Minister and first 
deputy Prime Minister respectively. The power sharing government appears unstable in 
its early days of formation and only time will tell if it is a workable arrangement.  
 
2 The selectorate theory will be explained in more detail in Chapter 4. 
 
3 Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) credit Shirk (1993) with the term “selectorate." 
